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Abstract
This paper studies how non-rational risk shocks affect the macroeconomy. Using a novel
identification design which exploits survey data on expectations of financial executives in the
US, I identify non-rational risk shocks via distortions in beliefs. Belief distortions are measured
through surprises in beliefs of credit spreads, defined as the difference between subjective and
objective forecasts. They are then used as a proxy for exogenous variation in the risk premium.
Belief distortions elicit due to overreaction of credit spreads, eventually leading to exaggerated
beliefs on financial markets. Results indicate that the constructed shocks have statistically and
economically meaningful effects. This has sizeable consequences for the U.S. economy: A
positive non-rational risk shock moves credit spreads remarkably while real activity and the
stock market decline.
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1. Introduction
Financial crises cause recessions and are costly. This insight was painfully acknowledged again after
the last financial crisis elicited in the US and hit the world economy. This has renewed the interest
in the long-standing question on how financial markets affect the macroeconomy. In comparison to
garden-variety recessions, recessions caused by preceding financial crises are costlier (Jordà et al.,
2013). The exact causal underpinnings of financial crises are still at the forefront of the current state
of debate. This paper provides an identification scheme lending support to the hypothesis of belief-
driven, and thus non-rational, risk shocks leading to financial crises. From a policy perspective,
non-rational risk shocks acting as a causal trigger of financial crises are of particular interest to
make the economy more resilient against future financial instability.
Financial crises exhibit certain similarities in their emergence and phases they cycle through.
Generally, we observe a pre-crisis, crisis, and after-crisis period. In the pre-crisis period there is
a buildup of credit, leverage, a lowering of credit spreads, and an expansion of output. Optimism
thrives, mounting in overoptimism. This leads to an undervaluation of the lower tail risk during the
credit boom which translates into a neglection of crash risk. This credit boom lays the seeds for the
subsequent collapse – the transition to the crisis is sudden. Bank runs, defaults, and losses to the
financial sector follow. Risk premia rise and distress quickly spills over to the real sector leading to
a contraction in credit and output. The aftermath of the crisis is a gradual recovery in credit, output,
and a fall in credit spreads. These mechanisms at work has been shown by a large body of empirical
literature, see inter alia Bordo et al. (2001), Borio and Lowe (2002), Schularick and Taylor (2012),
Simsek (2013), Baron and Xiong (2017), López-Salido et al. (2017) and Krishnamurthy and Muir
(2017).
Theoretical research on financial crises offers various channels capturing the interaction between
the financial sector and the real economy. First, the financial accelerator framework (Kiyotaki and
Moore, 1997, and Bernanke et al., 1999) postulates that balance sheets are strengthened in booms
and weakened in recessions, leading to an amplification of business cycle fluctuations. This does
not only affect banks’ balance sheets but can also affect non-financial firms or households. Hence,
this amplification mechanism may also run through housing net worth (Mian and Sufi, 2014) or
general household demand (Mian et al., 2020). Furthermore, amplification effects can be highly
nonlinear (Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014) or may be triggered by large, systemic shocks (He
and Krishnamurthy, 2019). In addition, Christiano et al. (2014) enrich the framework to allow for
time-varying risk premia characterized by the volatility of cross-sectional idiosyncratic uncertainty.
Second, the channel focusing on liquidity mismatches (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983), i.e., the
mismatch of short-term liabilities with illiquid long-term assets, allows for the possibility of bank
runs. Bank runs lead to asset liquidation for ”fire sale” prices, again amplifying distress in financial
2
and interbank markets due to the financial accelerator mechanism (Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2015,
Gertler et al., 2016, and Gertler et al., 2020). Third, a stream of literature starting with Matsuyama
et al. (2016) studies the endogeneity of credit cycles by introducing nonlinear dynamics. Here,
different types of investment projects generate other dynamics. While the Good projects generate
pecuniary externalities, the Bad projects redirect savings away from investment with demand
spillovers.1 Fourth, another stream of literature emphasizes the pivotal role of beliefs in the pre-
crises periods. Starting with the ideas of Minsky (1977) and Kindleberger (1978), credit builds
up over time due to exaggerated beliefs. A series of good-news shocks makes agents optimistic
about the future path of the economy. On the contrary, bad news lead to a strong revision of agents’
views on the economy, starting the transition to the crisis period. López-Salido et al. (2017) show
that a mean-reversion in credit-market sentiments predicts a change in the composition of external
finance. An inward shift in credit supply leads to a fall in net debt issuance and a contraction
in economic activity. Similarly, Greenwood and Hanson (2013) show the deterioration of credit
quality of corporate debt during credit booms.
In this paper, I study how non-rational risk shocks on credit markets affect the macroeconomy.
Connecting to the literature on belief-driven shocks, I propose a novel approach for the identification
of a shock to risk prevalent on credit and financial markets which constitutes one possible approach
how a financial crisis is triggered. As a first step, I measure belief distortions to construct surprises
in beliefs.2 As a next step, I quantitatively analyze the macroeconomic consequences of this non-
rational risk shock identified through surprises in beliefs. Here, I relate theoretically to the financial
accelerator framework on how a risk shock propagates through the macroeconomy. A belief-driven
shock refers back to the early ideas of behavioral forces driving the economy, as Keynes puts it in
his General Theory that „our decisions to do something positive [...] can only be taken as the result
of animal spirits —- a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of
a weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities“ (Keynes, 1936,
pp. 161-162). Minsky (1977) applied the idea of animal spirits to financial markets, where traders
driven by overoptimism begin to finance asset purchases by additional borrowing. This can lead
to a collective Ponzi scheme in which investors’ borrowing is merely based on the belief of an
appreciation of asset values to keep the system afloat. If optimism ceases, instability follows.
I argue that belief surprises are exogenous and characterize how risk is driven by behavioral
forces. Belief surprises are supposed to reflect exogenous variation in the risk premium according to
investors’ subjective notion of over- or undervaluation of risk. Credit spreads are a natural choice for
1 Financial frictions are still assumed exogenous in the work by Matsuyama et al. (2016). An extension by Kubin et al.
(2019) allows for a switching process in financial frictions according to aggregate sentiments in the economy, for
which empirical support has been found by Böck and Zörner (2019).
2 I will use the terms belief distortions and belief surprises interchangeably. While the former term is used as its
theoretical concept, surprises refer to operationalization with actual data.
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measuring risk premia. According to Elton et al. (2001) credit spreads differ across rating classes
not only due to their risk premium, but also due to their expected default loss.3 Additionally, a
liquidity premium can arise in time of financial distress. In order to minimize the effect of the default
premium, I use Moody’s Aaa rated corporate bond rates.4 There is also evidence that the liquidity
component did not rise for Aaa rated corporate bonds (Dick-Nielsen et al., 2012). Furthermore, I
redo the analysis with Moody’s Baa rated corporate bond rates to also gauge the effect of a higher
default rate or liquidity component. From these bond rates a long-term government yield of similar
maturity is deducted to construct credit spreads. Belief distortions in risk premia transmitted through
credit spreads are then measured as the difference between subjective and objective expectations
on risk. Hence, belief distortions are entirely forward looking and the stronger these distortions,
the bigger the difference of the subjective valuation of risk compared to its objective valuation. For
the subjective evaluations of the future, I rely on the Blue Chip (BC) Financial Indicators. In this
survey, a panel of financial executives is asked on their subjective risk expectations and it thus offers
a professionals’ assessment of financial markets. Objective evaluations of the future are constructed
in a model-consistent way, i.e., with the help of econometric models. Econometric models are not
distorted by sentiments and act as a machine benchmark. This resembles performing predictions
within the rational expectations framework. Hence, I estimate a series of flexible forecasting models,
where out-of-sample performance is used to discriminate between them.
The proposed identification scheme rests on the assumption that agents make systematic errors
in beliefs. Various explanations have been put forward, most noteworthy in this context is Bordalo
et al. (2018) applying the expectation formation framework of diagnostic expectations to the Baa
credit spread. Hence, before I construct surprises in beliefs, I analyze expectational reactions to
new information in credit spreads. Similar to the results in Bordalo et al. (2020), I provide evidence
that overreaction drives credit spreads. Therefore, evidence suggests to neglect the full information
rational expectations (FIRE) hypothesis. The out-of-sample forecasting exercise reveals that credit
spreads are best predicted by an autoregressive (AR) process with stochastic volatility (SV). This
represents the construction of objective expectations. Furthermore, two additional insights are worth
mentioning: Additional information on the macroeconomy features no predictive gains, pointing to
the strong forward-looking component in credit spreads, and the inclusion of SV controls to some
extent for excess volatility present in financial time series.
3The third component of credit spreads, the tax premium, arises because interest payments on corporate bonds are
differently taxed than those on government bonds, but this is disregarded in the analysis. Although they are an
important influence in explaining credit spreads, due to their inability to explain differences in credit spreads they are
not of concern in this setting.
4An interesting alternative is the excess bond premium (Gilchrist and Zakrajšek, 2012), the residual of a micro-based
approach to credit spreads freed from firm-specific information on default risk. Unfortunately, this is not suitable for
the current framework due to unavailability of subjective expectations thereof.
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After the construction of belief surprises, I analyze their macroeconomic effects. Using these
belief surprises as an exogenous instrument in a vector autoregression (VAR), I am able to compute
impulse response functions (IRFs) and perform a forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD)
to the identified non-rational risk shock. I find that the shock has statistically and economically
significant effects. Empirical estimates show that a non-rational risk shock elicits a jump in the risk
premium, a drop in the stock market index, and a dip of real activity into recessionary tendencies.
There is some subsample instability with respect to prices, but overall prices tend to decrease.
Short-term interest rates indicate accomodative monetary policy with strong anticipation effects by
the central bank. Effect sizes are stable across both spreads, indicating that the proposed proxy truly
recovers exogenous movements in the risk premium and is not blurred by movements in the default
premium. Additionally, the forecast error variance decomposition reveals that the non-rational risk
shock explains the bulk of the variance of the credit spread for a horizon up to one year. Furthermore,
a sizable share of the variance of the stock market variable while a notable share of real economic
activity and short-term interest rates can be explained for a short-run horizon of 1-2 years.
The results further suggest that the responses of a wide range of macroeconomic variables to
the identified non-rational risk shock have the expected signs and magnitudes. Studying various
propagation channels, I examine how the risk shock affects real consumption and investment, credit
market measures, the yield curve, the labor market, prices, and expectations. Interestingly, a shift
in the composition of external funding is visible. In case of financial distress market participants
shift their external funding from bond to bank finance valuing the higher flexibility. Risk shocks
are also associated with a sudden drop in prices, a delayed adjustment on the labor market, and a
sharp drop in expectations. Responses to expectations level out relatively quickly with a duration
of about one to one and a half years. This also suggests that financial market disruptions endure
only for a short time in subjective valuations.
To sum up, the contribution of this paper is threefold. First, I provide evidence on overreaction
in credit spreads. Second, I provide a novel identification of non-rational risk shocks. Hereby, I
use surprises in beliefs as an exogenous proxy to identify a VAR where belief surprises are defined
as the difference between subjective and objective evaluations of the future. I use survey data to
measure subjective evaluations of the future, while I resort to econometric models to construct
objective evaluations. Third, I analyze the effects of non-rational risk shocks and how it affects
macroeconomic quantitites.
Related empirical literature. This paper relates to several strands of literature. There is a
large amount of literature neglecting the FIRE assumption giving rise to various forms of belief
distortions. I also connect to the literature looking at how financial frictions affect uncertainty
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shocks and how to disentangle those shocks. Last, I connect to the literature explaining credit
spreads.
First, the number of studies looking at belief distortions in macroeconomics and finance is
growing fast. A large theoretical literature has emerged that tries to explain why economic agents
make systematic errors embedded in beliefs. These reasons include the presence of information
frictions (Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2015), the use of extrapolative expectations (e.g., De Long
et al., 1990, Barberis et al., 1998, Barberis et al., 2015), the overweighting of personal experience
(e.g., Malmendier and Nagel, 2011; 2016), the overreaction to incoming news (e.g., Bordalo
et al., 2018; Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2018; Bordalo et al., 2020), the this-time-is-different thinking
(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009), or the use of simple heuristics to forecast (e.g., Anufriev and Hommes,
2012; Assenza et al., 2019). However, they all have in common that the presence of new information
is given too much or too little weight. This happens because agents only have limited attention
(neglecting the full information assumption) or new information is processed in a non-rational or
behavioral way (neglecting the rational expectation assumption). For a recent survey see also Manski
(2018). Scholars are now also integrating those frameworks into macroeconomic models (Maxted,
2019) or look at the empirical consequences of belief distortions in inflation or GDP (Bianchi et al.,
2020). These observations reason the identification of financial risk shocks arising due to their
non-rational nature. In particular, the literature concerned with financial market behavior tends to
strongly neglect the rational expectations assumption.
Second, I also relate to the literature on the effects of economic uncertainty and its nexus to
financial shocks. Economic uncertainty plays a veritable role in influencing the business cycle
(Bloom, 2009) and scholars are increasingly interested in the exact causes and consequences of
economic uncertainty, specifically financial uncertainty, and its interaction with financial shocks. A
recent contribution by Ludvigson et al. (forthcoming) points out that macroeconomic uncertainty is
just an endogenous reaction, while financial uncertainty is a truly exogenous impulse to the economy
leading to a rapid drop in aggregate output. There is, however, a growing literature interested in
the interaction between uncertainty shocks and financial shocks. Here, Alfaro et al. (2018) coin
the term „finance-uncertainty multiplier“ (FUM) to indicate the role played by financial frictions
in amplifying the effects of uncertainty shocks. There is ample empirical evidence in support of
this hypothesis, e.g., Caldara et al. (2016), Furlanetto et al. (2019), Alessandri and Mumtaz (2019),
Chatterjee et al. (2020), or Caggiano et al. (2021).
Third, I relate to the literature on explaining credit spreads. There is an ongoing discussion on
the ”credit spread puzzle”, i.e., the claim that yield spreads on corporate bonds are larger than what
can be explained by default risk (Elton et al., 2001, Collin-Dufresn et al., 2001, or Driessen, 2005).
There are several studies on how liquidity affects asset prices and illiquidity has been put forward to
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explain the puzzle (Houweling et al., 2005 or Dick-Nielsen et al., 2012). Here, I add that behavioral
forces are able to drive credit spreads.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I introduce the identification
of non-rational risk shocks. For that, I propose how to construct belief suprises and provide
evidence on overreaction in credit spreads. In the next section, Section 3, the methodology for
constructing objective beliefs and for analyzing the macroeconomic effects to a non-rational risk
shock is introduced. In Section 4, I present the results of the empirical analysis. It begins with
finding the best model for constructing objective expectations, goes on with discussing the belief
surprise series, and ends with analyzing the macroeconomic effects of non-rational risk shocks. For
that, I rely on impulse response analysis, but also present alternative strategies for identification and
computing impulse response. Furthermore, I discuss the quantitative importance of the shock with
the help of a forecast error variance decomposition, before moving on to broader macroeconomic
propagation channels. Section 5 provides a sensitivity analysis along several dimensions. Finally,
Section 6 concludes.
2. Identification
The identification strategy of non-rational risk shocks in this paper builds upon the following obser-
vations. Financial markets do not seem to be efficient markets due to the presence of anomalies.5
Anomalies happen for no fundamental reason but occur due to things such as sunspots, animal spir-
its or mass psychology.6 Nevertheless, financial anomalies could also be present due to incomplete
information about the structure of the economic environment. In particular, Brav and Heaton (2002)
show that although both theories relax opposite assumptions of rational expectations, their predict-
ive similarity make them hard to distinguish from each other. Irrespective of these alternatives, the
outlined approach captures both aspects. After discussing the construction of belief surprises in
detail, I provide evidence on overreaction in credit spreads. This evidence defends the assumption
that surprises are indeed belief-driven in a non-rational manner.
5 I follow here Brav and Heaton (2002, p. 575) in defining a financial anomaly’ as ”a documented pattern of price
behavior that is inconsistent with the predictions of traditional efficient markets, rational expectations asset pricing
theory.”
6This led to the voluminous literature on behavioral finance, surveyed for instance in Shiller (2003, 2015) or Barberis
and Thaler (2003). Sunspots refer to a change in expectations influencing the economy without a relation to economic
fundamentals. Animal spirits as coined by Keynes refer to instincts, proclivities, and emotions influencing human
behavior. Mass psychology is a branch of psychology engaged with studying how individual behavior changes and
differs within a crowd.
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Construction of Belief Surprises
Belief distortions on financial markets are measured as the difference between subjective and
objective expectations of risk. Financial risk, in particular systematic risk, is strongly related to
the risk premium. Variations in the risk premium reflect investors’ subjective notion of over-
or undervaluation of risk prevalent in the economy. Feedback across investors lead to waves of
optimism or pessimism. Hence, I construct a series of belief surprises capturing belief distortions
on financial markets that can be used to identify a structural non-rational risk shock. Here, I am
following the framework in Bianchi et al. (2020) and define
Surprise [+ℎ] = F [+ℎ] − E [+ℎ], (2.1)
where +ℎ refers to the ℎ-step ahead (ℎ = 1, 2, 3, 4) credit spread under consideration (either the Aaa
or Baa credit spread),  indicates the time period. F [·] refers to the subjective expectations operator,
while E [·] refers to the objective, or rational, expectations operator. The resulting difference is
denoted as a surprise in beliefs at time . This is the measure of exogenous belief distortions
constructed in a completely forward-looking manner. Hence, the measure is also immune to the
Lucas critique.
Overreaction in Credit Spread Expectations
For the proposed identification scheme to work, I assume a departure from rationality of credit
spreads. This section defends this assumption and sheds light on the nature of belief distortions
happening on financial markets. Besides providing evidence on the departure of the FIRE assump-
tion, the data strongly point to overreaction in credit spreads. This can, for instance, be explained by
the expectation formation framework of diagnostic expectations (Bordalo et al., 2018). Testing the
rational expectations hypothesis, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) check whether forecast errors
can be predicted using information already available at the time the forecast is made. Furthermore,
understanding whether departures from rational expectations are due to over- or underreaction to
information is important evidence for the proposed identification scheme.
Data comes from the BC survey which is conducted on a monthly basis, asking around 40
panelists from major financial institutions for their expectations with respect to several financial
indicators.7 The survey is conducted around the beginning of each month. Data is taken from the
end-of-quarter month survey in March, June, September and December. Forecasts are available for
the current quarter  and for quarters  + 1 through  + 4. In total, the survey consists of about 150
7 The data were purchased and manually checked for errors before using the data in the analysis. Furthermore, one
may worry that BC financial forecasts are distorted due to signaling reasons. However, forecasts for variables also
entertained in the anonymous Philadelphia Fed Survey of Private Forecasters tend to be similar. The forecasts used in
this study are only available in the Blue Chip professional forecasts.
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Table 1: Error-on-Revision Regressions.
Consensus Individual
1 SE Obs. 

1 SE Obs. med(

1) med(Obs.) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
h = 1
Aaa spread 0.12 0.03 115 −0.13 0.01 4,096 −0.13 27.5 110
Baa spread 0.16 0.02 71 0.02 0.01 2,212 0.00 34.5 52
h = 2
Aaa spread 0.08 0.10 114 −0.20 0.02 4,122 −0.21 27 111
Baa spread 0.28 0.05 70 0.03 0.02 2,214 0.02 34 53
h = 3
Aaa spread 0.01 0.18 113 −0.26 0.02 4,105 −0.30 27 111
Baa spread 0.20 0.13 69 −0.06 0.03 2,206 −0.07 34 53
h = 4
Aaa spread 0.14 0.21 112 −0.27 0.02 4,062 −0.30 27 111
Baa spread 0.05 0.43 68 −0.19 0.04 2,167 −0.22 34 51
Notes: This table shows coefficients from forecast error on forecast revision regression. Column 1 to 6 show
the coefficients of consensus time series regressions and individual-level pooled panel regressions together
with standard errors (SE) and number of observations (Obs.). Column 7-9 shows the median coefficients,
median number of observations and number of forecasters () in forecaster-by-forecaster regressions. For
consensus time series regressions and pooled panel regressions, standard errors are Newey-West with the
automatic bandwidth selection procedure (Newey and West, 1994).
individual forecasters with varying sample lengths due to a change in the composition of forecasters
in the survey. In particular, I use forecasts of the Aaa and Baa corporate bond yield and the 10-year
Treasury yield. The spread is then computed as the difference between the particular corporate
bond yield and the Treasury yield. Data on the Aaa spread covers the period 1988Q1 to 2020Q1,
while the time series is considerably shorter for the Baa spread spanning from 1999Q1 to 2020Q1.
Data sources of the actual credit spreads are listed in Appendix A.
I denote the ℎ-step ahead consensus forecast made at time  for the future value of +ℎ of a credit





where F [+ℎ] is the forecast of individual  and  > 1 is the number of forecasters. Forecast
revisions at time  of individual  are defined as ,ℎ = (F
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 follows likewise. Predictability of forecast errors is measured by estimating the
following consensus regression








If forecast errors are not predictable from forecast revisions, I cannot reject the null hypothesis of
FIRE. This essentially reduces to testing whether 1 = 0. Otherwise, overreaction (underreaction)
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is implied by a negative (positive) coefficient 1. For instance, a positive coefficient 1 together
with a positive forecast revision, FR,ℎ > 0, implies that the consensus forecast is not optimistic
enough. Bordalo et al. (2020) extend this analysis by also analyzing forecast error predictability at
the individual level. They propose estimating a pooled panel regression model,
















where the common coefficient 1 indicates whether the average forecaster under- or overreacts to
their own information. Again, if 1 = 0 then FIRE cannot be rejected. Furthermore, they also
suggest forecaster-by-forecaster regressions,










+ℎ ∼ N(0, 
2
,
),  = 1, . . . ,  . (2.4)
This yields a distribution of individual coefficients 1 ( = 1, . . . , ), where I focus on the
median coefficient. Since this can result in varying sample sizes for the estimation (due to the
different lengths of different forecasters in the sample), I only keep forecasters with at least fifteen
observations. Furthermore, I winsorize outliers.8
Results of the error-on-revision regressions are presented in Table 1. Looking at the coefficients
from the consensus regression, 	1 > 0 indicates underreaction with varying statistical power. On
the contrary, coefficients from the pooled panel and individual-level regression are consistently
and precisely estimated negative, pointing to overreaction. These findings are similar to the one
presented in Bordalo et al. (2020). Their explanation is that individual forecasters overreact, but
concurrently do not react to all the information received by their peers. This creates rigidity in
the consensus forecast. In particular, this form of rigidity only holds for both credit spreads when
looking at shorter horizons and vanishes at longer ones. This provides quite strong evidence of
financial anomalies in credit spreads, e.g., excess volatility (Shiller, 1981) or herding behavior
(Lux, 1995). These findings have also been documented in experimental studies explaining pricing
on asset markets. Kocher et al. (2019) explain overpricing due to lack of traders’ self-control
transmitting into irrational exuberance in markets. Anufriev and Hommes (2012) argue in favor
of evolutionary selection among heterogeneous expectation rules tending to outperform rational
expectation benchmarks. To conclude this section, the FIRE assumption clearly does not hold for
credit spreads while evidence points to overreaction as a response to new information.
3. Methodological Framework
As illustrated before, I have to set up a methodological framework for formulating objective expect-
ations. Then, after the construction of surprises in beliefs, I illustrate the macroeconomic model
8 I follow here the approach taken by Bordalo et al. (2020). They exclude forecasts which are five interquartile ranges
away from the median. In case there is no variation in the interquartile range, I apply the interquartile range of the
previous period. This ensures consistency of the forecasts.
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identified with those surprises. In this section, I outline the methodological approach taken in this
paper to tackle these issues.
Econometric Approach: Forecasting
For the construction of an objective forecast E [+ℎ] I need to specify a forecasting model. Let
E [+ℎ] denote either a forecast of the Aaa or Baa credit spread at horizon ℎ ≥ 1 predicted at time
. In order to identify possible distortions in beliefs, it is imperative that the forecasting model
be as rich in information as possible to reduce a possible omitted variable bias. Concurrently, the
model has to be parsimonious to avoid spurious estimates. I tackle these issues with a two-pronged
approach that combines the estimation of factor models with regularization techniques. The factor
model allows for a parsimonious specification, where it reduces the information in more than 150
time series into a small number of factors. Regularization to the forecasting equation is introduced
with the help of shrinkage priors that regularize coefficients of variables containing no predictive
power towards zero. First, I take a high-dimensional dataset X of dimension  = 159 of economic
information on the US economy. X is suitably transformed to induce stationarity of the series.
Details on the exact dataset and the transformations can be found in Table A2 in the appendix. Let
the high-dimensional dataset have a factor structure taking the form
X =   +  ,  ∼ N (0,). (3.1)
 is a  × factor loadings matrix,  a ×1 estimated factor with  <<  and  are i.i.d. standard
normal errors. Common variation in the high-dimensional dataset X is thus captured by the vector
of factors  .9 The idiosyncratic components in  are independent across series. Choosing the
number of factors is a sensible issue (Bai and Ng, 2002). In order to find a trade-off between not
adding too many regressors to the forecasting model, and using all of the factor information, I use
 = 3 factors.10 As results show, adding information to the model does not pay off in additional
predictive power. Furthermore, let  ( × 1) being a subset of X containing additional non-factor
information as controls in the forecasting model. Hence, in the most general form, I consider the
following forecasting model for variable 
+ℎ =  +
−1∑
=0
  −  + −  + 

 −  + 
, 
 ∼ N(0, 
2
 ), ℎ ≥ 1. (3.2)
Each forecasting equation contains an intercept , autoregressive parameters   , coefficients for the
controls in  and coefficients for factors 

 . Innovations 
, follow a Gaussian distribution and its
variances 2 are allowed to be time-varying. Furthermore, the prior distribution on all coefficients
9 Factors are estimated with Principal Component Analysis.
10I re-estimate the model with  = 7 leading to no improvements in predictive power. See also Appendix F.
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follows the Normal-Gamma (NG) shrinkage prior as laid out in Griffin and Brown (2010) and
stochastic volatility is estimated with the framework provided by Kastner (2016).
This specification conveniently nests all models run in the forecasting exercise. In particular,
it nests the random-walk (RW) by setting 0 = 1 all else equal to zero. Furthermore, by setting
 = 

 = 0 it nests a wide variety of autoregressive (AR) processes. Adding additional information
in  which contains core economic variables11, such as real gross domestic product (GDP), the price
deflator of the gross domestic product, a short-term interest rate, and a stock market index together
with factor information enriches the information content of the model thoroughly and results in an
autoregressive distributed lag model (ARX). All specifications are run with time-variation in the
second moment, denoted by stochastic volatility (SV).
In all cases, the forecast horizon ℎ = 1, 2, 3, 4 is the same and predicted directly. Forecasts are
computed for both credit spreads, the Aaa and Baa spread. The sample of both models starts in
1970Q1 and is estimated in a rolling window fashion to keep the amount of information constant
across all models. The alternative of an extending window does not show qualitatively different
results (see also Table F2 and F4 in the appendix). All estimations are based on 25.000 draws from
the posterior distribution, where I discard the first 15.000 draws as burn-ins.
Econometric Approach: Shock Identification
Now I turn to the model description to analyze the macroeconomic effects of a non-rational risk
shock. Let {}=1 denote an -dimensional time series process. Consider the following reduced-
form VAR(p) model
 =  + 1−1 + . . . + − +  ,  ∼ N (0,), (3.3)
where  is the lag order,  is an ×1 vector of constants, 1, . . . ,  are × coefficient matrices
and  denotes an  × 1 vector of reduced-form Gaussian distributed innovations with possibly
time-varying covariance matrix  . In what follows I use stochastic volatility and a factorization of




 is a diagonal matrix with generic  th element   and 	−1 is a lower-triangular matrix with ones
on its main diagonal (Carriero et al., 2019). By taking logs the diagonal elements of  , those
elements follow a centered AR(1) process
ln , =   +   (ln ,−1 −   ) +  , ,   , ∼ N(0, 2 ),  = 1, . . . , . (3.5)
This constitutes the parameterized stochastic volatility model which intends to capture possible
effects of heteroskedasticity present in the sample under consideration.
11Here I use the same set of variables later used in the VAR analysis.
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 is a non-singular  ×  structural impact matrix and  is an  × 1 vector of structural
shocks. By definition, structural shocks are mutually uncorrelated, i.e.  () =  being diagonal.





In the following, I denote the non-rational risk shock without loss of generality as the first structural
shock in the VAR, 1, . Hence, the aim is to identify 1 corresponding to the first column of 
.
For the identification of the non-rational risk shock, I will use the series on belief surprises
as an external instrument. The methodology on identification with external instruments has been
introduced by Stock and Watson (2012), and is thoroughly discussed in Stock and Watson (2018)
and Montiel-Olea et al. (2020). It alleviates possible concerns of measurement error in the belief
surprise series. In general, an external instrument (or proxy) is a variable that is correlated with the
shock of interest but not with other shocks and works as follows. Suppose  denotes the external
instrument, in particular belief surprises in the Aaa or Baa credit spread. To be a valid instrument,
 must be correlated with the non-rational risk shock 1, and orthogonal to all other shocks 2:, ,
such that
E[, 1,] = Φ, (3.8)
E[, 2:,] = 0. (3.9)
Eq. (3.8) states the relevance assumption, while Eq. (3.9) is the exogeneity condition.12 Under those
assumption 1 is identified up to sign and scale. For the technical details, see Appendix B. The
scale 1,1 is then set by a normalization subject to  = 

′ . In the analysis, I will set  =  ,
which implies that a unit positive value of 1, has a one standard deviation positive effect on 1, .
Having obtained the impact vector, all objects of interest such as IRFs, FEVDs or the structural
shock series can be computed.
Following the work of Jarociński and Karadi (2020), I also use a second identification approach.
Here, I directly append the belief surprise series as the first variable in the system and use the
Cholesky decomposition for identification. Ordering the proxy first in a recursive identified VAR is
also called internal instrument approach (see the discussion in Plagborg-Møller and Wolf, 2019).
Implicitly, I assume the exogeneity of the belief surprise series to which all other variables in the
system react contemporaneously. This approach has its own advantages and shortcomings. On a
positive note, estimation is particularly simple and I do not have to rely on a two-step approach.
12Additionally, I have also to assume that the proxy is exogenous at all leads and lags to all structural shocks.
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Furthermore, it is possible to look explicitly at the response of the credit spread as the measure of
risk. A clear shortcoming is that possible measurement error can cause biases.
Additionally, structural VAR analysis is based on the invertability or fundamentalness assump-
tion i.e., the VAR contains all relevant information to recover the structural shocks from past
information. In case this assumption does not hold, it reduces essentially to an omitted variable
bias problem.13 Forni and Gambetti (2014) provide a testing procedure on whether a VAR contains
sufficient information. In Section 5, I use this testing procedure and do not find evidence that the
model is informationally insufficient.
Computing impulse responses using the VAR involves additional assumptions. For the validity
of the responses, the VAR has to be an adequate representation of the dynamics. In particular,
an impulse response of a VAR is a function of forecasts at increasingly distant horizons and
misspecification errors are thus compounded with the forecast horizon. A useful alternative is to
compute impulse responses to the identified non-rational risk shock using local projections (Jordà,
2005). Hence, I run the following set of regressions
,+ℎ =  + ,ℎ̂1, +
∑
=1
,  ,ℎ−  + ,,ℎ, N(0, 2 ), (3.10)
where ,+ℎ is the outcome variable of interest, ̂1, is the estimated median non-rational risk
shock identified from the external instruments VAR and −  is a set of controls included up to
lag  = 1, . . . , . The term ,ℎ can directly be interpreted as the impulse response of variable  at
horizon ℎ to the identified shock. In Section 4.4 I present the responses of the local projections
approach which produce comparable results. There is also evidence that these two approaches
should yield similar results (up to a scaling factor) as shown by Plagborg-Møller and Wolf (2019).
As the estimation procedure, I pursue a Bayesian approach to estimation. In particular, I follow
the approach by Huber and Feldkircher (2019). Their VAR framework is quite flexible and allows
for the introduction of adaptive shrinkage priors, particularly the Normal-Gamma prior (Griffin
and Brown, 2010). Again, I introduce regularization methods in the estimation framework. The
idea of shrinkage priors as a regularization technique is to push coefficients that are not adding
any information to the model towards zero to enable a more efficient estimation. Furthermore, the
triangularization in Eq. (3.4) easily allows for the introduction of stochastic volatility by Kastner
and Frühwirth-Schnatter (2014) and is implemented with its associated software package (Kastner,
2016).
13This assumption has to be fulfilled for the mapping in Eq. (3.6) to work, i.e., that the shocks can be recovered from
current and lagged values of observed data. However, identification in VARs with external instruments requires a
weaker assumption (Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco, 2019). In particular, only the shock of interest has to be invertible
since the identification scheme only leads to partial identification.
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Empirical Specification
The baseline specification includes six variables: Surprises in beliefs, the credit spread under
consideration, a stock market index, real GDP per capita, a price deflator of GDP, and a short-term
interest rate. In particular, I use the S&P 500 as a proxy for the stock market and the 1-year Treasury
constant maturity rate as the short-term interest rate depicting monetary policy actions. The choice
towards an interest rate with maturity of one year has the following reason: Contrary to the effective
federal funds rate or a Treasury bond with shorter maturity, the yield with one year maturity covers
(at least partly) the monetary policy actions with respect to forward guidance. The other variables
are standard in macroeconomic models. Nevertheless, the findings are robust to the choice of all
these indicators. For details on robustness with different variables used, see also the sensitivity
checks in Section 5.
The VAR is estimated in (log-)levels. A detailed overview on the data, the exact construction
and its sources can be found in Appendix A. Responses can thus be interpreted as elasticities. The
frequency of the data is quarterly, hence the lag order is set to  = 4. In terms of deterministics
only a constant term is included. However, the results turn out to be robust with respect to all these
choices, see again Section 5. All models considered are based on 25.000 draws from the posterior
distribution, where I discard the first 15.000 draws as burn-ins. Furthermore, I discard ex post all
non-stationary draws to ensure the stationarity of the VAR. In Appendix E I report convergence
diagnostics and the share of retained draws in each of the considered models.
Surprises in beliefs are the proxy of non-rational risk shocks and only included when identified
via the Cholesky decomposition. In the baseline model, it is used as an instrument to gauge
exogenous variation in the credit spread variable. Sample size varies according to the credit spread
under consideration: the sample including the Aaa spread spans from 1988Q1 to 2019Q4, while the
one including the Baa spread spans from 1999Q1 to 2019Q4. The reason for using quarterly data
is due to the nature of the survey forecasts for computing the belief surprises. By looking at both,
a non-rational risk shock transmitted through the Aaa and Baa credit spread with different samples
is done for two reasons. First, I can analyze the impact of possible higher default premiums present
in the Baa spread. Second, effects may be imprecisely estimated using only a short sample for the
Aaa spread. Nevertheless, similar effects across different identification procedures, sample spans,
and credit spreads are reassuring that the proposed identification strategy for the non-rational risk
shock is suitable.
4. Main Results
The presentation of the main results proceeds in six steps. First, I present results of the forecasting
exercise. I discriminate among the forecasting models according to out-of-sample performance.
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Table 2: Forecasting Evaluation.
h=1 h=2 h=3 h=4
Aaa spread Baa spread Aaa spread Baa spread Aaa spread Baa spread Aaa spread Baa spread
RW -101.99 -183.23 -65.78 -152.06 -79.62 -157.41 -93.14 -164.93
Autoregressive Models
AR(1) -36.94 -114.43 -70.34 -142.71 -93.92 -153.86 -110.62 -152.56
AR(2) -81.56 -168.57 -105.03 -185.68 -126.92 -176.36 -131.31 -157.78
AR(3) -141.38 -232.3 -139.13 -219.37 -145.97 -180.55 -151.47 -171.01
AR(1)-SV -12.12 -54.54 -60.84 -96.15 -80.4 -141.65 -109.93 -181.98
AR(2)-SV -41.09 -87.88 -80.83 -119.23 -92.58 -135.11 -112.82 -170.07
AR(3)-SV -92.91 -133.89 -101.19 -140.45 -104.99 -141.96 -122.22 -180.61
Autoregressive Distributed Lag Models
ARX(1) -83.45 -173.27 -86.99 -174.12 -107.8 -181.34 -125.09 -182.44
ARX(2) -132.86 -236.5 -115.06 -210.46 -131.95 -201.12 -162.38 -197.58
ARX(3) -182.62 -315.82 -146.21 -238.14 -190.76 -215.42 -220.5 -209.72
ARX(1)-SV -46.19 -90.4 -70.65 -112.35 -84.75 -145.49 -119.88 -202.15
ARX(2)-SV -84.93 -133.17 -90.48 -142.36 -136.37 -161.35 -146.68 -221.77
ARX(3)-SV -115.78 -181.21 -123.06 -170.33 -133.92 -177.08 -171.37 -227.81
Notes: Out-of-sample performance in terms of the sum of log predictive density scores (LPDS). Predictions
are computed in a rolling window fashion. The bold figures indicate the best performing model for a given
variable and time horizon. The following models nested in Eq. (3.2) are considered: RW - random walk,
AR - autoregressive model, ARX - autoregressive distributed lag model. The number in the parentheses
indicates the number of lags considered. SV refers to stochastic volatility.
Second, I construct and discuss belief surprises. Third, I turn to discussing the macroeconomic
effects of a non-rational risk shock in the baseline model. Fourth, I discuss alternative strategies for
identification and computation of impulse responses. Fifth, I examine the quantitative importance
of the non-rational risk shock with a forecast error variance decomposition. Sixth, I look at wider
macroeconomic effects of a non-rational risk shock not covered in the baseline model.
Objective Forecasts
In this section, I present the results of the objective forecasts constructed with the forecasting model.
To construct the belief surprises, I have to compute objective forecasts beforehand. In particular,
I assume that forecasts done with econometric models are model-consistent and use all available
data at time point  for the out-of-sample prediction in  + ℎ, (ℎ = 1, 2, 3, 4). In order to support
the hypothesis of objective forecasts, I run a series of forecasting models and use the best one to
measure belief distortions.
The results are presented in Table 2 and Figure 1. Generally, credit market spreads are extremely
forward-looking variables and commonly used as recession indicators. Hence, it comes as no
surprise that I do not find much predictive power through adding additional information and that
the random walk is a strong competitor. Nevertheless, mean-reverting behavior is clearly present in
16























































































































Notes: Cumulative log predictive density scores (LPDS) of out-of-sample forecasts of different models. Gray
bars indicate the NBER recession dates.
credit spreads and thus AR models with a low number of lags show a better forecasting performance.
Adding SV improves predictability further. Since both variables exhibit financial anomalies, such
as excess volatility or herd behavior, stochastic volatility may account for this enhancing forecast
performance. Looking more closely at the cumulative log predictive density scores (LPDS) in the
presented figure reveals that the Great Financial Crisis led to substantial drop in predictive power.
All recessions in both samples are indicated with gray bars corresponding to the NBER recession
dates. For short forecasting horizons up to half a year, the AR model with one lag and driven
by innovations with stochastic volatility is the best model. At longer horizons, the random walk
outperforms all other models in case of the Aaa spread while the Baa spread is predicted best by
other AR models.
On a more technical note, I perform predictions for both models with up to three lags, both with
and without stochastic volatility leading to 13 competing models for each variable and forecasting
horizon. Doing predictions including more lags, leads to a further deterioration in terms of LPDS and
17
Figure 2: Belief Surprises.
(a) Aaa surprises.




















Notes: Belief surprises in the Aaa and Baa risk spreads. Gray bars indicate the NBER recession dates.
are not presented here.14 As evaluation criterion, I use LPDS contrary to the commonly encountered
mean absolute error (MAE) or root mean squared error (RMSE).15 Bayesian estimation allows to
inspect the whole predictive densitiy via LPDS which is considered to be superior to only inspecting
the mean forecast. In particular, the LPDS is the logarithm of the likelihood of the unobserved
predicted value. Hence, it also takes into account the uncertainty of the prediction.
Belief Surprises
After the construction of objective expectations, I can now construct a quarterly series of belief
surprises as defined in Eq. (2.1). I do this for each horizon, but present and use for the main analysis
the one-step ahead belief surprises. The series are shown in Figure 2. Narrative evidence for key
historical episodes can be found. In particular, both series have a pronounced spike in the Great
Financial Crisis. The spike is dated at 2008Q4 giving support to the presented hypothesis. After the
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy on September 15, 2008 there was a huge positive surprise in beliefs.
The intuition is as follows: Subjective forecasts substantially worsened after the bankruptcy leading
to an increase in F [,+1] not yet accounted for in a rational manner (measured by E [,+1]) since
the Lehman bankruptcy per se did not lead to macroeconomic troubles). Furthermore, a strong
negative belief surprise is visible in several instances after a positive deviation. The channel works
also in the other direction, leading to a trend-reversal in subjective expectations.
Besides the narrative assessment, I also perform some simple diagnostic checks of the validity
of the series for measuring belief distortions. Results can be found in Appendix C. As pointed
14The number of parameters in the forecasting model increase by three per additional lag. There is already a strong
jump in LPDS from specifications with two to three lags depictable, which further exacerbates going up to four lags.
Results are available upon request.
15Results are rather stable for RMSEs. This can be seen in Table F3 and F4.
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out by Ramey (2016) structural shocks should not be autocorrelated or forecastable by other mac-
roeconomic indicators. Another feature is the uncorrelatedness with other structural shocks. First,
I inspect the series for autocorrelation where no evidence is found for its presence. Second, both
shock series cannot be forecasted by other macroeconomic variables (I use those included in the
VAR later on). A series of Granger-causality tests in Table C1 finds no evidence of any power in
forecasting the two belief surprise series. Third, correlations to other structural shocks we know
from the literature are low and presented in Figure C2. Therefore, the belief surprise series for
both credit spreads are used as external instrument in the ongoing analysis in order to identify
non-rational risk shocks.
Macroeconomic Effects of Non-Rational Risk Shocks
I present now the results from the baseline model, identified using the external instruments approach.
Before discussing the effects on the macroeconomy, I also test for the strength of the instrument.
Inference only produces reliables estimates when the instrument and the shock are strongly correl-
ated. Hence, as a first step I test for the strength of the instrument. I follow the recommendation
by Montiel-Olea et al. (2020) that a weak instrument problem is not present if the corresponding
F-statistic of the first-stage regression is safely above 10. Evidence presented in Appendix D suggest
that there is no weak instrument problem at hand.
Figure 3 presents the impulse responses to an identified non-rational risk shock, normalized to
a one standard deviation shock to surprises in beliefs. The stock market index, real GDP per capita
and the GDP deflator are in logs, responses can be interpreted as elasticities. The responses of
credit spreads and the short-term interest rates are in percentage points. The solid black lines are the
posterior median and the gray shaded areas are 68, 80 and 90 percent confidence bands. Impulse
responses are computed for a horizon of 24 quarters.
A one standard deviation increase in belief surprises causes a non-rational risk shock eliciting
an immediate jump of credit spreads. The increase is slightly stronger for the Baa spread than
for the Aaa spread. This causes a persistent and significant fall in both, the stock market and real
activity. Responses to both risk shocks are remarkably similar in terms of their size, about −2.5%
depreciation of asset prices and a loss of −0.2% in output as measured by GDP per capita. Prices,
as measured by the GDP deflator, decline to both shocks. Although the response in the model
identified with surprises in the Aaa credit spread does not seem to change significantly while it
clearly does so in the model identified with belief surprises in the Baa spread. This is not a feature
of one of the credit spreads but rather relates to a subsample stability problem. I re-estimate the
model keeping the sample size constant (1999Q1-2019Q4) and report the results in Figure G1 in
the appendix. Responses then show no qualitative differences across using different credit spreads.
Last, short-term interest rate drops significantly on impact with a gradual return to the zero line.
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Figure 3: Impulse Response Functions to a Non-Rational Risk Shock.
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Notes: Impulse response functions of the basline VAR. Identification via external instrument. Black line denotes
median response while gray shaded areas denote the 68/80/90 percent confidence intervals. The responses of
stock market index, real activity, and prices are scaled in percent, while the spread and interest rate responses are
scaled in percentage points.
This points to an accomodative expansionary monetary policy taken by the central banks. Since
there are already counteractive measures visible on impact, this may point to the information set of
the central bank being superior in anticipating financial market distress. Interestingly, responses are
remarkably similar across the two models. While the Baa spread increases slightly stronger after a
one standard deviation shock to the non-rational risk shock, effect sizes of outcome variables are
robust to the choice of the credit spread. Hence, results do not seem to be driven by the presence
of a higher default or liquidity premium in Baa credit spread. This indicates that the proposed
identification scheme indeed recovers exogenous variation in the risk premium.
The macroeconomic effects are comparable to the ones in the literature. Gilchrist and Zakrajšek
(2012) find that an increase in the excess bond premium of about 20 basis points leads to a reduction
in the level of real GDP of about 0.5 percentage points. Similarly, Furlanetto et al. (2019) find a
reaction of GDP of about 2-4% after a one-standard deviation financial shock identified with sign-
restrictions. They use the spread between the Baa spread and the Federal Funds rate as a measure of
20
the financial shock which exhibits a higher standard deviation than the Baa spread used here. Data
in the sample used here imply a standard deviation of about 1.6 of the Baa to the Federal Funds rate
spread, while both standard deviations of spreads used in this paper are between 0.5− 0.7. Also the
work by López-Salido et al. (2017) finds a 2% change of real GDP per capita when a unit change
in the Baa spread happens. Nevertheless, they do not state a causal statement but a mere predictive
one.
Alternative Strategies
As discussed before, an alternative to using external instruments for identification is the internal
identification approach. Furthermore, if the VAR is not an adequate representation of the dynamics
in the data, an alternative is to compute impulses responses using local projections. Hence, I also
present results using these approaches. Figure 4 shows in panel (a) impulse responses to the same
shock by using the internal instrument approach. In panel (b) one finds the impulse responses
computed with local projections.
The internal instruments approach is implemented by appending the proxy as the first variable
in the VAR system and doing a simple Cholesky-type identification scheme. Hence, the underlying
assumption is that all variables in the system can instantaneously react to the identified non-rational
risk shock. First, effects are less precisely estimated which may be due to measurement error in
the proxy. Second, impulse responses tend to be very similar qualitatively. Nevertheless, some
differences are worth mentioning. Interestingly, most responses do not react on impact while their
dynamic behavior is similar. This holds particularly for credit spreads, real GDP per capita, GDP
deflator and partly for the short-term interest rate. Third, the strongest difference arises with respect
to the stock market index. While there is a significant decline in the baseline model identified
by external instruments, this is not depictable from the model identified by internal instruments.
From economic theory we would expect that stock markets react to risk shocks, thus this may be a
shortcoming of this approach.
To analyze whether the impulse responses depend on the underlying VAR structure, I compute
the responses to the identified non-rational risk shock using local projections. Generally, effects tend
to be again very similar qualitatively, but less precisely estimated which is a known issue of local
projections. Responses tend to smooth out faster in local projections than in the model identified
by external instruments. This is clearly visible for the credit spreads, stock market index, real GDP
per capita, and short-term interest rates. So, this may point to the fact that impulse responses of the
VAR impose to much persistence on the responses and constitute an upper bound. Again, the most
striking differences arise with respect to responses of the stock market index. Local projections
point to a quite strong reaction of the stock market. This pattern is likewise visible for GDP per
capita, while responses of prices and interest rates tend to be slightly smaller in magnitude.
21
Figure 4: Alternative Strategies.
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Notes: Impulse response functions to a non-rational risk shock. Upper panel is based on identification with
internal instrument, lower panel shows local projections. Both are compared to impulse responses of the baseline
VAR (orange). Bold lines denote median response while gray shaded areas / dashed lines denote the 68/80/90
percent confidence intervals. The responses of stock market index, real activity, and prices are scaled in percent,
while the spread and interest rate responses are scaled in percentage points.
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Figure 5: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
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Notes: Forecast error variance decomposition of the variables in the system to the non-rational risk shock. Bold
lines denote median response while gray shaded areas / dashed lines denote the 68/80/90 percent confidence
intervals.
Summing up, alternative identification schemes and methods to compute impulse response
do not show qualitatively different behavior despite minor differences. Non-rational risk shocks
clearly have an impact on the stock market and the real sector while nominal adjustments happen.
Behavioral forces can thus be seen as causal underpinnings of business cycle instabilities. The
shock tends to be temporary and smooth out after 1-2 years.
Quantitative Importance
As a next step, I analyze the quantitative importance of non-rational risk shocks. This analysis
reveals how much of the variation in the variables in the VAR system is explained by non-rational
risk shocks. Figure 5 presents the results. Non-rational risk shocks explain initially a large share
of the movements in credit spreads, which quickly declines pointing to the rather short longevity of
the impact on spreads. However, the non-rational risk shock explains a sizable share in the forecast
error variance of the S&P 500. Starting at a share of about one third, this increases further over the
horizon. Furthermore, the quantitative impact on real activity as measured by real GDP per capita
is visible. At maximum, 18 percent and 12 percent of the forecast error variance of real activity is
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explained in the respective model at rather short horizons. In the second year after the impact to
the shock, the explained variance gradually declines towards zero. Similarly, the explained forecast
error variance in short-term interest rates is only visible at short horizons before returning to the
zero line. Almost none of the variance in prices is explained by non-rational risk shocks.
Together with the impulse response analysis, this provides further evidence of a strong, but
short-lived temporary non-rational risk shock. Risk premia as measured by credit spreads are only
temporarily pushed by non-rational forces while a strong impact to the stock market is presented.
Belief distortions are able to have signifcant effects on the macroeconomy and contribute meaning-
fully to variations in real GDP per capita. Additionally, the findings are comparable to ones in the
literature (Gilchrist and Zakrajšek, 2012; Furlanetto et al., 2019).
Wider Macroeconomic Effects
The baseline model is relatively small and leaves out core macroeconomic variables. In order to
get a better understanding of how the risk shocks affect the macroeconomy, I estimate additional
models extending the original baseline VAR by adding one variable at a time. This approach is quite
flexible and allows me to look at various transmission channels of financial risk shocks. Sample
size, lag specification and anything else related to the estimation is exactly as in the baseline model
identified with external instruments. Again, I test for the strength of the instrument which is not an
issue here where results are available in Appendix D. In the following, I will analyze the effects
on various components of GDP, credit market measures, the yield curve, labor market indicators,
prices, and expectations.
First, I look at subcomponents of real GDP per capita in Figure 6. To be comparable, I also
transform real consumption and real investment into per capita terms. Responses are similar to a
non-rational risk shock. Investment drops stronger than consumption and even stronger than GDP
itself which relates to business cycle stylized facts. Turning to the responses to the shock of the
credit market variables in Figure 6, i.e., bank credit, and commercial and industrial loans (labelled
business loans), an initial positive reaction is visible for both variables. Afterwards responses turn
negative eventually in the case of bank credit and quite significantly for business loans. Furthermore,
the initial positive reaction is of shorter maturity for the latter. This constitutes a kind of credit
puzzle for which I offer the following explanation: The initial positive reaction may point to a
shift in the form of external financing. In particular, a portfolio redeployment effect can explain
the short-term positive impact on credit-based measures indicating that agents start shifting from
bond-based financing to bank-based financing on the financial markets. Crouzet (2018) investigates
the transmission of financial shocks where corporate credit is intermediated via both bank and bond
markets. He shows that firms trade-off greater flexibility of bank-based financing in case of financial
distress against lower costs of bond issuance. Next, I turn to the respones of the yield curve and
24
Figure 6: GDP Components, Credit Market, and Yield Curve.
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Notes: Responses to different components of GDP, the credit market and the yield curve. Identification via
external instrument. Black line denotes median response while gray shaded areas denote the 68/80/90 percent
confidence intervals. Responses of GDP and credit market components are scaled in percent, while interest rate
responses are scaled in percentage points.
the Federal Funds rate in Figure 6. The term premium is defined as the difference between 10-year
and 1-year Treasury constant maturity rate. While the response of the former is almost identical
to the responses of the short-term interest rate in Figure 3 showing that the exact measurement of
monetary policy is only of minor importance. The term premium, or the slope of the yield curve,
increases and reaches its maximum after two years. This indicates a flight to safe assets as measured
by long-term yields in the case of the identified non-rational financial risk. In particular, after the
Lehman collapse in 2008 safe assets contracted drastically. Since the sample period safely covers
not only the period of the zero lower bound in the aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis, heightend
demand for safe assets as an endogenous explanation for risk premia is not a pressing issue here
(see inter alia Caballero et al., 2017 or Caballero and Farhi, 2018).
Next, I turn to the discussion of labor market indicators and prices in Figure 7. The figure
shows the impulse responses of labor market indicators, i.e., total hours worked, unemployment and
labor force participation, and the reaction of various price measures, i.e., consumer prices, producer
prices, and the real wage. The labor market is significantly and negatively affected, but with a short
25
Figure 7: Labor Market and Prices.
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Notes: Responses to different indicators of the labor market and prices. Identification via external instrument.
Black line denotes median response while gray shaded areas denote the 68/80/90 percent confidence intervals.
All responses are scaled in percent.
delay. Both the unemployment rate and total hours worked display a muted response on impact,
reaching its maximum after about five quarters. Labor force participation also shows a significant
decline. This is suggestive of the presence of frictions in the labor market, such as contractual
obligations, which delays the adjustments. This is also in line with the findings of Chodorow-Reich
(2014) showing that credit matters for employment decisions. Firms have a lower likelihood of
obtaining a loan after a credit crunch resulting in adverse labor market outcomes. Concerning
the price responses, wages decline in a sluggish fashion and are estimated with large uncertainty.
Conversely, the contraction in consumer and producer prices is rather sudden.
Last, I also add four measures of expectations one at a time to the model. Responses are
shown in Figure 8. All of them come from the University of Michigan Survey of Consumers and
depict consumer sentiment, expected business conditions in the next and five years ahead, and
unemployment expectations in the next year. They serve as proxies how economic agents perceive
the current economic outlook and the future outlook, both tackling the consumers’ view and the
business’ view. All of them show a sudden deterioration with a rather quick return to their old
value. Depending on the exact measure and risk shock, adjustments to the old value are reached
within two years. This is additional evidence for the transient nature of non-rational risk shocks and
the interconnectedness of expectations. If agents experience unexpected surprises in beliefs, their
outlook on other sectors of the economy is also affected.
In this section, I only present the impulse response of the additional variable added to the model,
but not the responses of the whole model to the non-rational risk shocks. Hence, Figure H6 in the
26
Figure 8: Measures of Expectations.
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Notes: Responses to different measures of expectations. Identification via external instrument. Black line denotes
median response while gray shaded areas denote the 68/80/90 percent confidence intervals. All responses are
scaled in percent.
appendix presents the additional impulse responses of the baseline model together with the median
responses of all models considered here. Responses of the other variables in the system do not
change much when information is added to the model.
5. Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, I perform a comprehensive set of sensitivity checks. In particular, I present sensitivity
checks with respect to the forecasting exercise, the identification of non-rational risk shocks and
analyze the robustness of the macroeconomic model with respect to model specification and data
choices. All corresponding tables and figures can be found in Appendices F to H.
Forecasting
Forecasts can be performed in various ways. To provide robustness to some of these choices, I
conduct the following sensitivity checks which are presented in the Appendix F, i.e., Table F1 to F4.
First, out-of-sample forecasts can either be done in an extended or rolling window fashion. While
the former acknowledges all available information, the latter keeps the amount of information which
is used constant. Switching to the extending window procedure, does not alter the forecasting
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performance much. In particular, the dominance of the AR(1)-SV as the best model is even more
pronounced. Second, choosing the number of factors and additional controls is a sensible issue.
To check the sensitivity of the results, I re-estimate the model using no controls in  and vary
the number of factors with  = 3 and  = 7. Again, the best performing model only differs in on
instance as compared to Table 2. Third, I discriminate among models with LPDS. Since I only use
point estimates for constructing belief surprises, it is only fair to also base the evaluation criterion on
the point forecast, e.g., using root mean squared errors (RMSEs). The dominance of the AR(1)-SV
model is weaker and the RW wins the forecasting race quite often. This shows that the AR(1)-SV
is picking up forecasts with lower uncertainty offering lower LPDS. Nevertheless, macroeconomic
effects are stable with respect to switching to the random walk as objective forecasts.
Identification
Identification rests on the construction of surprises in beliefs to measure belief distortions on
financial markets. Here, I provide sensitivity checks to three issues: choosing a different horizon
for the expectations for the construction of the belief surprises, performing a placebo test in which I
replace subjective survey forecasts with a simple RW, and checking whether the VAR is invertable.
Results are available in Appendix G.
First, I check whether the specified horizon causes differences. For that, I examine the implied
impulse responses when using the two-, three-, and four-step ahead belief surprise as well as the
mean over the one- to four-step ahead belief surprises. Responses do change only little showing
stability over these choices. In Figures G2 to G5, the results are presented.
Second, I perform a placebo exercise. Here, I replace subjective expectations with random-walk
expectations. Hence, I check whether subjective forecasts have indeed information not present in
objective evaluations of the future. As results in Figure G6 suggest, impulse responses vanish when
checking with this placebo belief surprise series.
Third, I provide sensitivity with respect to invertability. A necessary condition for (partial)
identification is that the VAR spans all relevant information. Forni and Gambetti (2014) provide a
test procedure which works as follows. To verify that the structural shock with the baseline VAR
specification can be truly recovered, I regress on the identified structural shock 1, macroeconomic
factors. These factors  are the same as the one used in the forecasting exercise and represent
the whole US macroeconomy. If all necessary information is already contained in the VAR, the
structural shock – the non-rational risk shock – should be orthogonal to the lags of the factors − ,
 > 0. Hence, this orthogonality condition is the necessary condition that the structural shock is
free of measurement error. The null of fundamentalness is rejected if, and only if, orthogonality is
rejected. Results can be found in Table G1 indicating that fundamentalness can be rejected overall.
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Model Specification and Data Choices
The last set of sensitivity checks are concerned with the model specification and data choices.
Choosing the appropriate lag length in VARs is a sensible issue, thus I re-estimate the baseline model
with up to five lags. Nevertheless, this issue is of minor magnitude since I rely on regularization
techniques. Moreover, macroeconomic concepts can be operationalized with various empirical
available variables. For instance, industrial production is a widely used indicator for economic
activity besides GDP. To provide robustness with respect to these choices, I re-estimate the baseline
model exchanging one variable at a time. In particular, I use industrial production instead of GDP
per capita as measure of economic activity, the NASDAQ composite index instead of the S&P 500
as a stock market index, and consumer prices instead of the GDP deflator as price measure. Finally,
I also re-estimate the baseline model without stochastic volatility. Combining all these choice,
results in 50 specifications which I provide in Figures H1 to H5 in Appendix H. I conclude that
results are robust to all these choices.
6. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I investigate how a non-rational risk shock affects the macroeconomy. For that purpose,
I provide a novel identification scheme to identify non-rational risk shocks on financial markets.
In particular, I use belief distortions to account for non-rational behavior on financial markets as
documented by many scholars. For the identification, I define belief surprises as the difference
between subjective and objective expectations. While the former are measured through survey
forecasts on credit spreads from financial executives, the latter is constructed as an out-of-sample
prediction of credit spreads estimated with the help of econometric models.
Evidence suggest that risk premia transmitted through credit spreads are overreacting to in-
coming news. This is a necessary condition for the identification to work. For the construction of
objective forecasts, a set of econometric time series models are estimated where the AR(1)-SV has
superior forecasting properties. For each horizon, the best – in terms of forecasting performance –
model is chosen to construct surprises in beliefs.
The proxy identifies a non-rational risk shock in a VAR. A one-standard deviation surprise in
beliefs leads to a jump in risk premia, a depression of output, and a decline in the stock market
index. Furthermore, prices fall and monetary policy is accomodative. Interestingly, responses
are stable across both credit spreads indicating that the non-rational component in belief surprises
identifies movements in the risk premium and not in the default or liquidity premium. Furthermore,
quantitative importance of the risk shock is shown by a forecast error variance decomposition. Last,
the shock has the expected signs on a wide range of additional macroeconomic quantities and is
robust to various choices.
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JAROCIŃSKI M, AND KARADI P (2020), “Deconstructing monetary policy surprises—the role of informa-
tion shocks,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 12(2), 1–43. [13, 42]
JORDÀ Ò (2005), “Estimation and inference of impulse responses by local projections,” American Economic
Review 95(1), 161–182. [14]
JORDÀ Ò, SCHULARICK M, AND TAYLOR AM (2013), “When credit bites back,” Journal of Money, Credit
and Banking 45(s2), 3–28. [2]
JURADO K, LUDVIGSON SC, AND NG S (2015), “Measuring uncertainty,” American Economic Review
105(3), 1177–1216. [42]
KÄNZIG DR (2021), “The macroeconomic effects of oil supply news: Evidence from OPEC announce-
ments,” American Economic Review 111(4), 1092–1125. [42]
KASTNER G (2016), “Dealing with Stochastic Volatility in Time Series Using the R Package stochvol,”
Journal of Statistical Software 69(5), 1–30. [12, 14]
KASTNER G, AND FRÜHWIRTH-SCHNATTER S (2014), “Ancillarity-sufficiency interweaving strategy
(ASIS) for boosting MCMC estimation of stochastic volatility models,” Computational Statistics & Data
Analysis 76, 408–423. [14]
KEYNES JM (1936), The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, London: Macmillan. [3]
KILIAN L (2009), “Not all oil price shocks are alike: Disentangling demand and supply shocks in the crude
oil market,” American Economic Review 99(3), 1053–69. [42]
32
KINDLEBERGER CP (1978), Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crisis, New York: Basic
Books. [3]
KIYOTAKI N, AND MOORE J (1997), “Credit cycles,” Journal of Political Economy 105(2), 211–248. [2]
KOCHER MG, LUCKS KE, AND SCHINDLER D (2019), “Unleashing animal spirits: Self-control and over-
pricing in experimental asset markets,” The Review of Financial Studies 32(6), 2149–2178. [10]
KRISHNAMURTHY A, AND MUIR T (2017), “How Credit Cycles across a Financial Crisis,” Working Paper
23850, National Bureau of Economic Research. [2]
KUBIN I, ZÖRNER TO, GARDINI L, AND COMMENDATORE P (2019), “A credit cycle model with market
sentiments,” Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 50, 159–174. [3]
LUDVIGSON SC, MA S, AND NG S (forthcoming), “Uncertainty and business cycles: exogenous impulse
or endogenous response?” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics . [6]
LUX T (1995), “Herd behaviour, bubbles and crashes,” The Economic Journal 105(431), 881–896. [10]
LÓPEZ-SALIDO D, STEIN JC, AND ZAKRAJŠEK E (2017), “Credit-Market Sentiment and the Business
Cycle*,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 132(3), 1373–1426. [2, 3, 21]
MALMENDIER U, AND NAGEL S (2011), “Depression babies: do macroeconomic experiences affect risk
taking?” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 126(1), 373–416. [6]
——— (2016), “Learning from inflation experiences,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 131(1), 53–87.
[6]
MANSKI CF (2018), “Survey measurement of probabilistic macroeconomic expectations: progress and
promise,” NBER Macroeconomics Annual 32(1), 411–471. [6]
MATSUYAMA K, SUSHKO I, AND GARDINI L (2016), “Revisiting the model of credit cycles with good and
bad projects,” Journal of Economic Theory 163, 525–556. [3]
MAXTED P (2019), “A Macro-Finance Model with Sentiment,” Technical report, Harvard University Work-
ing Paper. [6]
MERTENS K, AND RAVN MO (2013), “The dynamic effects of personal and corporate income tax changes
in the United States,” American Economic Review 103(4), 1212–47. [41]
MIAN A, AND SUFI A (2014), “What explains the 2007–2009 drop in employment?” Econometrica 82(6),
2197–2223. [2]
MIAN A, SUFI A, AND VERNER E (2020), “How does credit supply expansion affect the real economy? the
productive capacity and household demand channels,” The Journal of Finance 75(2), 949–994. [2]
MINSKY HP (1977), “The Financial Instability Hypothesis: An Interpretation of Keynes and an Alternative
to "Standard" Theory,” Challenge 20(1), 20–27. [3]
MIRANDA-AGRIPPINO S, AND RICCO G (2019), “Identification with external instruments in structural vars
under partial invertibility,” (13853). [14]
——— (2020), “The Transmission of Monetary Policy Shocks,” American Economic Journal: Macroeco-
nomics forthcoming. [42]
MONTIEL-OLEA JL, STOCK JH, AND WATSON MW (2020), “Inference in structural vector autoregressions
identified with an external instrument,” Journal of Econometrics . [13, 19, 44]
NEWEY WK, AND WEST KD (1994), “Automatic lag selection in covariance matrix estimation,” The Re-
view of Economic Studies 61(4), 631–653. [9]
PLAGBORG-MØLLER M, AND WOLF CK (2019), “Local projections and VARs estimate the same impulse
responses,” Unpublished paper: Department of Economics, Princeton University 1. [13, 14]
33
RAFTERY AE, AND LEWIS SM (1992), “[Practical Markov Chain Monte Carlo]: comment: one long run
with diagnostics: implementation strategies for Markov Chain Monte Carlo,” Statistical Science 7(4),
493–497. [46]
RAMEY VA (2016), “Macroeconomic shocks and their propagation,” Handbook of macroeconomics 2, 71–
162. [19]
REINHART CM, AND ROGOFF KS (2009), This time is different: Eight centuries of financial folly, Princeton
University Press. [6]
ROMER CD, AND ROMER DH (2004), “A new measure of monetary shocks: Derivation and implications,”
American Economic Review 94(4), 1055–1084. [42]
——— (2010), “The macroeconomic effects of tax changes: estimates based on a new measure of fiscal
shocks,” American Economic Review 100(3), 763–801. [42]
SCHULARICK M, AND TAYLOR AM (2012), “Credit booms gone bust: Monetary policy, leverage cycles,
and financial crises, 1870-2008,” American Economic Review 102(2), 1029–61. [2]
SHILLER RJ (1981), “Do stock prices move too much to be justified by subsequent changes in dividends?”
American Economic Review 71, 421–436. [10]
——— (2003), “From efficient markets theory to behavioral finance,” Journal of Economic Perspectives
17(1), 83–104. [7]
——— (2015), Irrational Exuberance: Revised and Expanded Third Edition, Princeton University Press.
[7]
SIMSEK A (2013), “Belief disagreements and collateral constraints,” Econometrica 81(1), 1–53. [2]
STOCK JH, AND WATSON MW (2012), “Disentangling the Channels of the 2007-2009 Recession,” Working
Paper 18094, National Bureau of Economic Research. [13, 41]
——— (2018), “Identification and estimation of dynamic causal effects in macroeconomics using external
instruments,” The Economic Journal 128(610), 917–948. [13]
34
A. Data
All series were downloaded from the sources listed below including the FRED database, Blue Chip Financial
Indicators, Robert Shiller’s website and the Michigan Survey of Consumers (Dominitz and Manski, 2004).
Data from the St. Louis’ FRED database were downloaded using the R-package fredr (Boysel and Vaughan,
2019). All time series cover the time period 1970Q1 to 2019Q4 except the survey forecasts. All series are
seasonally adjusted, either by downloading the already adjusted series from FRED or by applying a quarterly
X11 filter based on an AR(4) model to the unadjusted series. Some series in the database are observed only
on a monthly basis and quarterly values are computed by obtaining quarterly averages. Concerning the data
series used for computing factors, all variables are transformed to be approximately stationary. In particular,
the column Tcode shows the transformation I apply to a series: 1 – no transformation (levels); 2 – first
difference; 4 – logarithms; 5 – first difference of logarithms; 6 – second difference in logarithms.
In Table A1 I define all variables used in the estimations. Table A2 provides a comprehensive overview
of all variables and its exact definition. They are categorized in real activity measures, money, credit and
finance measures, interest rates, prices, expectations, and additional. The latter is not used to construct the
factors.
Table A1: Variable Definitions
Aaa spread AAA − GS10
Baa spread BAA − GS10





S&P 500 100 × ln(SP500)
GDP Deflator 100 × ln(GDPDEF)
Short-term Interest Rate GS1










Bank Credit 100 × ln(LOANINV)
Business Loans 100 × ln(BUSLOANS)
Federal Funds Rate FEDFUNDS
Term Premium GS10 − GS1






Labor Force Participation 100 × ln(CIVPART)
Consumer Prices 100 × ln(CPIAUCSL)
Producer Prices 100 × ln(PPIACO)
real Wage 100 × ln(COMPRNFB)
Consumer Sentiment 100 × ln(UMCSENT)
Business Expectations 1Y 100 × ln(BCE1Y)
Business Expectations 5Y 100 × ln(BCE5Y)
Unemployment Expectations 100 × ln(UE1Y)
NASDAQ 100 × ln(NASDAQCOM)
Industrial Production 100 × ln(INDPRO)
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Table A2: Raw Data
# Mnemonic Description Tcode
Real Activity Measures
1 GDPC1 Real Gross Domestic Product, 3 Decimal 5
2 GPDIC1 Real Gross Private Domestic Investment 5
3 TCU Capacity Utilization: Total Index 1
4 CBI Change in Private Inventories 1
5 FINSAL Final Sales of Domestic Product 5
6 FSDP Final Sales to Domestic Purchasers 5
7 FINSLC1 Real Final Sales of Domestic Product, 3 Decimal 5
8 GGSAVE Gross Government Saving 1
9 TGDEF Net Government Saving 1
10 GSAVE Gross Saving 5
11 FPI Fixed Private Investment 5
12 PRFI Private Residential Fixed Investment 5
13 GFDEBTN Federal Debt: Total Public Debt 5
14 W068RCQ027SBEA Government total expenditures 5
15 W006RC1Q027SBEA Federal government current tax receipts 5
16 SLINV State and Local Government Gross Investment 5
17 SLEXPND State and Local Government Current Expenditure 5
18 EXPGSC1 Real Exports of Goods and Services, 3 Decimal 5
19 IMPGSC1 Real Imports of Goods and Services, 3 Decimal 5
20 CIVA Corporate Inventory Valuation Adjustement 1
21 CP Corporate Profits After Tax 5
22 CNCF Corporate Net Cash Flow 5
23 DIVIDEND Net Corporate Dividends 5
24 PCE Personal Consumption Expenditure 5
25 PCESV Personal Consumption Expenditure: Services 5
26 PCEDG Personal Consumption Expenditure: Durable Goods 5
27 PCEND Personal Consumption Expenditure: Nondurable Goods 5
28 GPDI Gross Private Domestic Investment 5
29 INDPRO Industrial Production Index 5
30 HOABS Business Sector: Hours of All Persons 5
31 HCOMPBS Business Sector: Compensation per Hour 5
32 RCPHBS Business Sector: Real Compensation per Hour 5
33 ULCBS Business Sector: Unit Labor Cost 5
34 COMPNFB Nonfarm Business Sector: Compensation per Hour 5
35 HOANBS Nonfarm Business Sector: Hours of All Persons 5
36 COMPRNFB Nonfarm Business Sector: Real Compensation per Hour 5
37 ULCNFB Nonfarm Business Sector: Unit Labor Cost 5
38 UNRATE Unemployment Rate 2
39 CIVPART Labor Force Participation Rate 2
40 UEMPLT5 Civilians Unemployed for Less Than 5 Weeks 5
41 UEMP5TO14 Civilians Unemployed for 5-14 Weeks 5
42 UEMP15OV Civilians Unemployed for Over 15 Weeks 5
Continued on next page
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Table A2 – Continued from previous page
# Mnemonic Description Tcode
43 UEMP15TO26 Civilians Unemployed for 15-26 Weeks 5
44 UEMP27OV Civilians Unemployed for Over 27 Weeks 5
45 NDMANEMP All Employees: Nondurable Goods 5
46 MANEMP All Employees: Manufacturing 5
47 SRVPRD All Employees: Service-Providing Industries 5
48 USTPU All Employees: Trade, Transportation and Industries 5
49 USWTRADE All Employees: Wholesale Trade 5
50 USTRADE All Employees: Retail Trade 5
51 USFIRE All Employees: Financial Activities 5
52 USEHS All Employees: Education and Health Services 5
53 USPBS All Employees: Professional and Business Services 5
54 USINFO All Employees: Information Services 5
55 USSERV All Employees: Other Services 5
56 USPRIV All Employees: Total Private Industries 5
57 USGOVT All Employees: Government 5
58 USLAH All Employees: Leisure and Hospitality 5
59 AHECONS Average Hourly Earnings: Construction 5
60 AHEMAN Average Hourly Earnings: Manufacturing 5
61 AHETPI Average Hourly Earnings: Total Private Industries 6
62 AWOTMAN Average Weekly Hours: Overtime: Manufacturing 1
63 AWHMAN Average Weekly Hours: Manufacturing 1
64 HOUST Housing Starts: Total 5
65 HOUSTNE Housing Starts: Northeast Census Region 5
66 HOUSTMW Housing Starts: Midwest Census Region 5
67 HOUSTS Housing Starts: South Census Region 5
68 HOUSTW Housing Starts: West Census Region 5
69 HOUST1F Housing Starts: 1-Unit Structures 5
70 PERMIT New Private Housing Units Authorized by Building Permit 5
Money, Credit and Finance Measures
71 NONREVSL Total Nonrevolving Credit Outstanding, Billions of Dollars 5
72 USGSEC US Government Securities at All Commercial Banks 5
73 OTHSEC Other Securities at All Comercial Banks 5
74 TOTALSL Total Consumer Credit Outstanding 5
75 CMDEBT Household Sector: Liabilities: Household Credit Market
Debt Outstanding
5
76 BUSLOANS Commercial and Industrial Loans at All Commercial Banks 5
77 CONSUMER Consumer (Individual) Loans at All Commercial Banks 5
78 LOANS Total Loans and Leases at Commercial Banks 6
79 LOANINV Total Loans and Investments at All Commercial Banks 6
80 INVEST Total Investments at All Commercial Banks 5
81 REALLN Real Estate Loans at All Commercial Banks 6
82 AMBSL Board of Governors Monetary Base, Adjusted for Changes
in Reserve Requirements
5
Continued on next page
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Table A2 – Continued from previous page
# Mnemonic Description Tcode
83 REQRESNS Required Reserves, Not Adjusted for Changes in Reserve
Requirements
5
84 RESBALNS Reserve Balances with Fed. Res. Banks, Not Adj. for
Changes in Reserve Req.
5
85 BORROW Total Borrowings of Depository Institutions from the Fed-
eral Reserve
5
86 M1SL M1 Money Stock 6
87 CURRSL Currency Component of M1 5
88 CURRDD Currency Component of M1 Plus Demand Deposits 5
89 M2SL M2 Money Stock 6
90 M2OWN M2 Own Rate 6
91 M2MSL M2 Minus Small Time Deposits 6
92 M2MOWN M2 Minus Own Rate 6
93 MZMSL MZM Money Stock 6
94 SVSTCBSL Savings and Small Time Deposits at Commercial Banks 6
95 SVSTSL Savings and Small Time Deposits - Total 6
96 SVGCBSL Savings Deposits at Commercial Banks 6
97 SVGTI Savings Deposits at Thrift Institutions 6
98 SAVINGSL Savings Deposits - Total 6
99 STDCBSL Small Time Deposits at Commercial Banks 6
100 STDTI Small Time Deposits at Thrift Institutions 6
101 STDSL Small Time Deposits - Total 6
102 USGVDDNS US Government Demand Deposits and Note Balances -
Total
5
103 USGDCB US Government Demand Deposits at Commercial Banks 5
104 CURRCIR Currency in Circulation 5
105 NASDAQCOM NASDAQ Composite Index 5
Interest Rates
106 MPRIME Bank Prime Loan Rate 1
107 FEDFUNDS Effective Federal Funds Rate 1
108 TB3MS 3-month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate 1
109 TB6MS 6-month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate 1
110 GS1 1-year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate 1
111 GS2 2-year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate 1
112 GS3 3-year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate 1
113 GS5 5-year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate 1
114 GS10 10-year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate 1
115 GS30 30-year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate 1
116 AAA Moody’s Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield 1
117 BAA Moody’s Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield 1
Prices
118 GDPDEF Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator 6
Continued on next page
38
Table A2 – Continued from previous page
# Mnemonic Description Tcode
119 GDPCTPI Gross Domestic Product: Chain-type Price Index 6
120 PCECTPI Personal Consumption Expenditures: Chain-type Price In-
dex
6
121 PPIACO PPI: All Commodities 6
122 WPU0561 PPI by Commodity for Fuels and Related Products and
Power: Crude Petroleum
6
123 WPUFD4111 PPI: Finished Consumer Foods 6
124 WPUFD49502 PPI: Finished Consumer Goods 6
125 WPSFD41311 PPI: Finished Consumer Goods Excluding Foods and En-
ergy
6
126 WPSFD49207 PPI: Finished Goods 6
127 WPSFD41312 PPI: Finished Goods: Capital Equipment 6
128 PPIENG PPI: Fuels and Related Products, Power 6
129 PPIIDC PPI: Industrial Commodities 6
130 WPSID61 PPI by Commodity for Intermediate Demand by Commod-
ity Type: Processed Goods for Intermediate Demand
6
131 CPIAUCSL CPI for All Urban Consumers: All Items 6
132 CPIUFDSL CPI for All Urban Consumers: Food 6
133 CPIENGSL CPI for All Urban Consumers: Energy 6
134 CPILEGSL CPI for All Urban Consumers: All Items Less Energy 6
135 CPIULFSL CPI for All Urban Consumers: All Items Less Food 6
136 CPILFESL CPI for All Urban Consumers: All Items Less Energy and
Food
6
137 WTISPLC Spot Oil Price: West Texas Intermediate 6
138 EXSZUS Switzerland / US Foreign Exchange Rate 5
139 EXJPUS Japan / US Foreign Exchange Rate 5
140 EXUSUK US / UK Foreign Exchange Rate 5
141 EXCAUS Canada / US Foreign Exchange Rate 5
Expectations
142 sTB3MS TB3MS - FEDFUNDS 1
143 sTB6MS TB6MS - FEDFUNDS 1
144 sGS1 GS1 - FEDFUNDS 1
145 sGS3 GS3 - FEDFUNDS 1
146 sGS5 GS5 - FEDFUNDS 1
147 sGS10 GS10 - FEDFUNDS 1
148 sMPRIME MPRIME - FEDFUNDS 1
149 sAAA AAA - FEDFUNDS 1
150 sBAA BBB - FEDFUNDS 1
151 MICH University of Michigan: Inflation Expectation 1
152 BSCICP03USM665S Business Tendency Surveys for Manufacturing: Confidence
Indicators: Composite Indicators: OECD
1
153 CSINFT02USM460S Consumer Opinion Surveys: Consumer Prices: Future
Tendency of Inflation
1
Continued on next page
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# Mnemonic Description Tcode
154 AAA10Y Moody’s Seasoned Corporate Bond Yield Relative to Yield
on 10-year Treasury Constant Maturity
1
155 BAA10Y Moody’s Seasoned Corporate Bond Yield Relative to Yield
on 10-Yyear Treasury Constant Maturity
1
156 UMCSENT University of Michigan: Index of Consumer Sentiment 1
157 BCE1Y University of Michigan: Business Conditions Expected
During the Next Year
1
158 BCE5Y University of Michigan: Business Conditions Expected
During the Next 5 Years
1
159 UE1Y University of Michigan: Expected Change in Unemploy-
ment During the Next Year
1
Additional (not used for factor estimation)
160 CNP16OV Population Level (taken from FRED)
161 SP500 Stock Market Index (taken from Robert Shiller’s web-
site; Link to website: http://www.econ.yale.edu/
~shiller/)
162 F [,+ℎ] Expectations on Aaa rated corporate bond yields (taken
from Blue Chip Financial Indicators)
163 F [,+ℎ] Expectations on Baa rated corporate bond yields (taken
from Blue Chip Financial Indicators)
164 F [	
10,+ℎ] Expectation on 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
(taken from Blue Chip Financial Indicators)
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B. Identification based on External Instruments
The identification scheme on external instruments is introduced by Stock and Watson (2012) and Mertens
and Ravn (2013). The approach used here resembles strongly the one pursued in Gertler and Karadi (2015)
to identify monetary policy shocks. Generally, it is similar to a two stage least squares procedure, where
the reduced form residuals of the structural shock are regressed on the instrument  . I assume that the
reduced-form innovation of the first variable in the system is the measurement of the structural shock. To
proceed, I then regress the fitted values on the other reduced form residuals,
2:, = ̂1, +  ,  ∼  (0, 2). (B.1)
Here, 2:, are the reduced-form innovations of all other variables in the system, while ̂1, is the fitted
value of the first-stage regression. Therefore,I get an estimate for the ratio , which is the structural effect
of a unit shock on the other variables in the system. In order to use this, I have to restore the first column
of 
 denoted by 1 to identify the non-rational structural risk shock. To do this, I partition the matrix of the
structural coefficients, such that







In the equation 11 is a scalar, ′12 and 21 are vectors of size −1×1, and 22 is a matrix of size −1×−1.







Note that the baseline model is enriched with time-varying volatilities, thus the covariance matrix has an
additional subindex . In the following, I will use the median estimate of  for the computation of impulse
responses. Then 11 is identified up to a sign convention and is obtained by the following closed form solution




12 = (21 − 11)
′−1(21 − 11), (B.5)
with
 = 11
′ − (21′ + ′21) + 22. (B.6)
41
C. Diagnostics of the Belief Surprise Series
As discussed in the paper, I perform a number of validity checks on the surprise series. First, I investigate
whether autocorrelation is present in the surprise series. Figure C1 depicts the autocorrelation function. For
both series, there is no evidence that the series is serially autocorrelated. I also perform Granger causality
tests. Table C1 shows that there is almost no predictive causality running from any of those variables to
the constructed series of belief surprises. Only the stock market indices show modest amount of predictive
density around the edges of conventional significance levels. Last, I compute correlations to other structural
shocks we know from the literature. In particular, I compare the belief surprises in the Aaa and Baa credit
spread to high-frequency monetary policy shocks in Jarociński and Karadi (2020) (labelled HFI Monetary
Policy), the narrative fiscal policy shocks by Romer and Romer (2010) (labelled RR Fiscal Policy), the
uncertainty indicators based on Jurado et al. (2015) (labelled Financial Uncertainty, Macro Uncertainty
and Real Uncertainty), the economic policy uncertainty indicator by Baker et al. (2016) (labelled Economic
Policy Uncertainty), the extended high-frequency monetary policy instrument by Miranda-Agrippino and
Ricco (2020) (labelled HFI Monetary Policy Ext1 and HFI Monetary Policy Ext2), the extended monetary
policy measured constructed by Romer and Romer (2004) and extended by Breitenlechner (2018) (labelled
RR Monetary Policy 1 and RR Monetary Policy 2), high-frequency oil supply and supply news shocks by
Känzig (2021) (labelled HFI Oil Supply and HFI Oil News), and the structural oil supply and demand as
well as the aggregate demand shock by Kilian (2009) (labelled Oil Supply, Aggregate Demand (Oil), and Oil
Demand). Correlations are depicted in Figure C2 and are rather low to the proposed belief surprise series.
Table C1: Granger Causality Tests.









Notes: Table shows p-values of a series of Granger causality tests of the belief surprise
series using a selection of macroeconomic and financial variables. Series are transformed to
stationarity according to transformations provided in Table A2. The lag order is set to 1 and
in terms of deterministics, only a constant term is included.
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Figure C1: Autocorrelation Function of Belief Surprise Series.
(a) Aaa Belief Surprises.



















(b) Baa Belief Surprises.
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D. Weak Instrument Test
The main identifying assumption behind the external instruments approach is that the instrument is correlated
with the shock of interest but uncorrelated with all other structural shocks. However, even if this holds,
inference will not produce reliable results in case the instrument and the shock are only weakly correlated.
Hence, it is important to test the strength of the instrument. Following Montiel-Olea et al. (2020), this
can be done using an F-test in the first-stage regression of the credit spread residual from the VAR on the
instrument. In order for the weak instrument problem not to be present, they recommend a threshold of 10
for the corresponding F-statistic.
Table D1 presents the results on this test for the models used in the analysis. I report the standard
F-statistic and robust F-statistic allowing for heteroskedasticity. In addition, I test this by including lags of the
proxies (the respective belief surprise series) where I choose the number of lags to be the same as in the VAR.
The instruments turn out to be strong with F-statistics safely above the threshold of 10. In particular, for the
baseline model the standard and robust F-statistics are above the threshold. Additionally, when looking at the
model appending other variables, issues of weak instruments do not arise. Hence, overall evidence suggest
that there is no weak instrument problem at hand.
Correlation of the belief surprises series is highest for the uncertainty indices which comes at no surprise.
While this paper identifies a shock on its first-moment via distortions in beliefs, studies concentrating on
uncertainty identify shocks with its second-moment. This also relates to the uncertainty literature as discussed
earlier. Interestingly, the negative correlation to the high-frequency identified oil supply news shock series is
not negligible although still small.
Table D1: Tests on Instrument Strength
Model F-statistic F-statistic (robust) F-statistic + lags F-statistic (robust) + lags
Baseline Model
– Aaa 241.25 202.90 51.76 44.70
– Baa 335.11 57.30 80.24 18.06
Wider Model
real Consumption:
– Aaa 231.62 193.08 49.84 42.3
– Baa 290.89 24.77 72.11 9.45
real Investment:
– Aaa 221.37 170.61 47.24 37.79
– Baa 286.38 30.4 72.2 14.40
Bank Credit:
– Aaa 228.35 187.87 48.33 41.13
– Baa 331.56 37.28 77.94 14.05
Business Loans:
– Aaa 227.08 202.28 50.32 45.08
– Baa 288.53 49.26 71.04 13.33
Federal Funds Rate:
– Aaa 228.55 199.35 49.36 43.83
– Baa 300.18 55.66 75.28 17.63
Term Premium:
– Aaa 210.66 170.27 45.82 39.04
– Baa 329.67 55.52 81.10 19.21
Continued on next page
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Model F-statistic F-statistic (robust) F-statistic + lags F-statistic (robust) + lags
Hours:
– Aaa 208.44 163.47 45.18 37.3
– Baa 323.59 38.06 75.91 12.87
Unemployment:
– Aaa 221.95 151.75 48.22 35.09
– Baa 306.1 23.79 73.07 7.72
Labor Force Participation:
– Aaa 223.64 179.66 48.10 39.46
– Baa 312.24 36.82 72.04 11.12
Consumer Prices:
– Aaa 228.37 197.38 48.95 44.09
– Baa 300.12 49.9 69.80 14.91
Producer Prices:
– Aaa 197.33 177.18 45.31 40.68
– Baa 282.16 52.16 62.37 10.91
Real Wage:
– Aaa 241.68 195.79 50.83 41.20
– Baa 306.48 40.26 74.14 12.04
Consumer Sentiment:
– Aaa 215.71 186.11 46.97 40.22
– Baa 282.69 44.96 70.38 16.89
Business Expectations 1Y:
– Aaa 221.79 200.5 48.97 43.66
– Baa 259.42 69.74 67.49 22.34
Business Expectations 5Y:
– Aaa 231.27 194.22 49.98 41.74
– Baa 300.05 50.42 72.58 14.3
Unemployment Expectations
1Y:
– Aaa 218.93 139.62 46.75 32.43
– Baa 311.61 46.97 73.79 15.33
Notes: Table shows the results of the first-stage regressions of the credit spread residual 1, on the
belief surprises. Column 3 and 4 indicate with lags that lagged values are also included as controls.
F-statistics above 10 indicate strong instruments. Robust F-statistic allow for heteroskedasticity.
45
E. Convergence Diagnostics
In this section, I evaluate convergence of the model presented in Section 3.2. For the MCMC algorithm I refer
to Huber and Feldkircher (2019). To proceed, I look at three different convergence diagnostics. In an ideal
setting, the sampler returns independent draws. The stronger the autocorrelation in the sampler, the more
draws are needed. To evaluate the extent of autocorrelation in the MCMC chain, I use three different statistics.
First, I compute inefficiency factors indicating how many draws are needed for drawing one identically and
independently distributed draw. Second, I have a look at the Raftery and Lewis’s diagnostic statistic (Raftery
and Lewis, 1992). It is also a measure of autocorrelation and returns a dependence factor which should not
exceed 5 in the ideal setting. Third, I examine Geweke’s convergence diagnostic (Geweke et al., 1991). This
is a test of equality of the means of the first 10% and last 50% of the MCMC chain. Here, I report the share
of Z-scores exceeding the critical value of 1.96.
For all models, convergence is safely achieved. While inefficiency factors are around 2-3, the dependence
factors do not exceed 5 at a single time. Also, when looking at the share of Z-scores exceeding the critical
value of 1.96 it does not seem to be an issue. In the last column of Table E1, I report the percentage of
retained draws of stationary draws. This percentage share fluctuates more, but most of the time more than
10% of all draws are retained for posterior analysis.
Table E1: Convergence Statistics
Model Inefficiency Factor Dependence factor Geweke’s Z-scores % draws retained
Baseline Model
– Aaa 2.37 1.82 0.04 17.88
– Baa 3.00 2.47 0.02 29.29
Wider Model
real Consumption:
– Aaa 2.91 2.33 0.05 29.90
– Baa 2.65 2.43 0.02 23.81
real Investment:
– Aaa 2.14 1.89 0.06 16.01
– Baa 2.52 2.19 0.03 17.53
Bank Credit:
– Aaa 1.79 1.76 0.05 11.28
– Baa 3.21 2.67 0.03 27.70
Business Loans:
– Aaa 2.25 1.95 0.02 18.05
– Baa 2.75 2.42 0.02 23.98
Federal Funds Rate:
– Aaa 2.57 2.00 0.04 20.01
– Baa 3.01 2.66 0.03 27.49
Term Premium:
– Aaa 2.31 2.01 0.06 19.38
– Baa 3.11 2.69 0.02 29.44
Hours:
– Aaa 2.99 2.28 0.03 29.26
– Baa 2.44 2.20 0.05 17.36
Unemployment:
– Aaa 2.41 2.00 0.03 19.21
Continued on next page
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Model Inefficiency Factor Dependence factor Geweke’s Z-scores % draws retained
– Baa 2.48 2.30 0.01 21.04
Labor Force Participation:
– Aaa 3.25 2.65 0.02 39.65
– Baa 1.55 1.86 0.03 6.32
Consumer Prices:
– Aaa 2.59 2.17 0.05 24.56
– Baa 2.46 2.25 0.06 20.03
Producer Prices:
– Aaa 2.43 1.96 0.06 19.91
– Baa 1.59 1.91 0.03 7.62
Real Wage:
– Aaa 1.85 1.81 0.10 11.22
– Baa 2.47 2.27 0.07 19.88
Consumer Sentiment:
– Aaa 2.29 1.99 0.05 19.71
– Baa 2.64 2.41 0.03 22.97
Business Expectations 1Y:
– Aaa 2.14 1.99 0.01 18.63
– Baa 2.93 2.69 0.02 26.15
Business Expectations 5Y:
– Aaa 2.22 1.98 0.04 20.03
– Baa 2.58 2.30 0.04 19.97
Unemployment Expectations
1Y:
– Aaa 2.04 1.92 0.05 15.33
– Baa 3.09 2.81 0.03 31.19
Notes: Table shows mean inefficiency factors and mean dependence factor for specific variable groups.
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F. Robustness: Forecasting
In this section, I present additional results of the forecasting exercise. In the following, I extend Table 2
adding two additional models. First, in both models I exclude non-factor information in  , indicated with
 = 0, while I allow for either  = 3 factors like in the baseline specification, or up to  = 7 factors. Results
show that there is a minor improvement in forecasting the Baa spread three quarters ahead. Apart from
that, all results are robust to additional choices concerning the number of factors and including additional
information.
Tables F2 to F4 present results from performing forecasts in an extending window fashion, and evaluating
the forecasts with RMSEs. Interestingly, RMSEs point increasingly to the random-walk for forecasts at a
more distant horizon. Nevertheless, the one-step ahead prediction is dominated by the AR(1)-SV model.
Table F1: Robustness: Forecasting Evaluation
h=1 h=2 h=3 h=4
Aaa spread Baa spread Aaa spread Baa spread Aaa spread Baa spread Aaa spread Baa spread
RW -101.99 -183.23 -65.78 -152.06 -79.62 -157.41 -93.14 -164.93
Autoregressive Models
AR(1) -36.94 -114.43 -70.34 -142.71 -93.92 -153.86 -110.62 -152.56
AR(2) -81.56 -168.57 -105.03 -185.68 -126.92 -176.36 -131.31 -157.78
AR(3) -141.38 -232.3 -139.13 -219.37 -145.97 -180.55 -151.47 -171.01
AR(1)-SV -12.12 -54.54 -60.84 -96.15 -80.4 -141.65 -109.93 -181.98
AR(2)-SV -41.09 -87.88 -80.83 -119.23 -92.58 -135.11 -112.82 -170.07
AR(3)-SV -92.91 -133.89 -101.19 -140.45 -104.99 -141.96 -122.22 -180.61
Autoregressive Distributed Lag Models ( = 3,  = 4)
ARX(1) -83.45 -173.27 -86.99 -174.12 -107.8 -181.34 -125.09 -182.44
ARX(2) -132.86 -236.5 -115.06 -210.46 -131.95 -201.12 -162.38 -197.58
ARX(3) -182.62 -315.82 -146.21 -238.14 -190.76 -215.42 -220.5 -209.72
ARX(1)-SV -46.19 -90.4 -70.65 -112.35 -84.75 -145.49 -119.88 -202.15
ARX(2)-SV -84.93 -133.17 -90.48 -142.36 -136.37 -161.35 -146.68 -221.77
ARX(3)-SV -115.78 -181.21 -123.06 -170.33 -133.92 -177.08 -171.37 -227.81
Autoregressive Distributed Lag Models ( = 3,  = 0)
ARX(1) -71.54 -164.33 -84.78 -167.00 -105.11 -171.69 -118.58 -172.61
ARX(2) -134.65 -233.27 -119.04 -206.89 -136.43 -197.82 -162.53 -192.32
ARX(3) -180.53 -307.99 -152.24 -239.92 -187.32 -216.34 -222.08 -209.14
ARX(1)-SV -39.56 -91.83 -65.13 -113.09 -83.45 -130.83 -116.76 -182.06
ARX(2)-SV -87.46 -143.52 -90.99 -141.13 -119.5 -156.06 -136.71 -211.22
ARX(3)-SV -116.65 -190.91 -128.49 -173.39 -123.35 -180.78 -166.06 -245.73
Autoregressive Distributed Lag Models ( = 7,  = 0)
ARX(1) -67.55 -162.02 -80.83 -165.12 -108.16 -169.60 -131.37 -168.05
ARX(2) -129.13 -236.46 -123.03 -206.45 -133.74 -196.02 -166.74 -190.68
ARX(3) -177.28 -314.38 -152.98 -237.17 -191.82 -210.23 -220.61 -203.06
ARX(1)-SV -36.61 -86.84 -64.81 -116.80 -88.53 -155.99 -124.39 -213.00
ARX(2)-SV -79.88 -136.39 -94.51 -143.24 -112.86 -166.56 -139.28 -216.24
ARX(3)-SV -110.63 -181.21 -116.48 -172.06 -131.08 -175.46 -153.38 -222.69
Notes: Out-of-sample performance in terms of the sum of log predictive density scores (LPDS). Predictions
are computed in an rolling window fashion. The bold figures indicate the best performing model for a given
variable and time horizon. The following models nested in Eq. (3.2) are considered: RW - random walk,
AR - autoregressive model, ARX - autoregressive distributed lag model. The number in the parentheses
indicates the number of lags considered. SV refers to stochastic volatility.
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Table F2: Robustness: Forecast Evaluation (Extending Window).
h=1 h=2 h=3 h=4
Aaa spread Baa spread Aaa spread Baa spread Aaa spread Baa spread Aaa spread Baa spread
RW -80.60 -180.76 -62.62 -151.38 -80.45 -151.64 -92.97 -151.23
Autoregressive Models
AR(1) -31.87 -116.11 -65.55 -138.82 -87.27 -148.42 -103.68 -148.86
AR(2) -77.12 -169.69 -99.63 -183.57 -119.05 -174.37 -128.84 -154.39
AR(3) -136.48 -237.15 -131.97 -213.73 -136.32 -172.61 -135.07 -160.56
AR(1)-SV -17.14 -57.77 -60.31 -97.17 -82.44 -136.15 -108.84 -175.54
AR(2)-SV -54.29 -87.92 -88.58 -120.17 -98.29 -140.65 -110.65 -177.05
AR(3)-SV -109.68 -140.54 -107.61 -139.74 -109.19 -141.68 -102.16 -173.43
Autoregressive Distributed Lag Models ( = 3,  = 4)
ARX(1) -73.25 -182.86 -77.7 -171.20 -89.43 -175.54 -102.42 -181.61
ARX(2) -122.48 -250.79 -111.66 -209.13 -119.73 -200.29 -139.49 -200.12
ARX(3) -176.65 -317.94 -141.22 -234.79 -140.55 -209.99 -148.95 -208.29
ARX(1)-SV -52.69 -91.82 -71.72 -109.81 -90.81 -136.78 -119.66 -193.52
ARX(2)-SV -101.40 -141.59 -99.54 -139.44 -124.31 -154.67 -165.96 -201.37
ARX(3)-SV -142.02 -180.21 -123.79 -159.14 -131.14 -148.49 -146.54 -186.48
Autoregressive Distributed Lag Models ( = 3,  = 0)
ARX(1) -67.95 -167.59 -78.66 -165.04 -92.68 -168.56 -106.80 -173.96
ARX(2) -123.24 -236.47 -110.08 -204.03 -123.95 -192.15 -135.36 -193.13
ARX(3) -173.98 -307.33 -141.30 -229.72 -143.76 -206.80 -143.28 -201.71
ARX(1)-SV -50.54 -91.36 -70.90 -112.35 -86.35 -133.69 -103.89 -186.28
ARX(2)-SV -102.79 -144.04 -99.77 -142.49 -109.91 -157.98 -118.52 -201.40
ARX(3)-SV -146.71 -195.03 -125.56 -169.35 -117.09 -162.17 -118.44 -197.38
Autoregressive Distributed Lag Models ( = 7,  = 0)
ARX(1) -62.53 -164.36 -72.82 -160.16 -85.00 -162.92 -94.71 -164.30
ARX(2) -119.72 -238.05 -106.02 -201.34 -115.44 -189.83 -125.57 -187.17
ARX(3) -167.24 -307.78 -134.73 -223.82 -137.61 -202.88 -135.86 -199.73
ARX(1)-SV -45.15 -84.93 -65.52 -111.00 -77.17 -128.20 -100.32 -208.62
ARX(2)-SV -96.55 -141.00 -96.08 -143.21 -103.56 -149.94 -126.34 -193.82
ARX(3)-SV -134.66 -183.67 -117.82 -172.75 -121.33 -154.57 -124.92 -197.41
Notes: Out-of-sample performance in terms of the sum of log predictive density scores (LPDS). Predictions
are computed in an extending window fashion. The bold figures indicate the best performing model for
a given variable and time horizon. The following models nested in Eq. (3.2) are considered: RW -
random walk, AR - autoregressive model, ARX - autoregressive distributed lag model. The number in the
parentheses indicates the number of lags considered. SV refers to stochastic volatility.
Table F3: Robustness: Forecast Evaluation (RMSEs).
h=1 h=2 h=3 h=4
Aaa spread Baa spread Aaa spread Baa spread Aaa spread Baa spread Aaa spread Baa spread
RW 27.95 33.88 33.62 43.23 39.05 48.55 42.20 53.22
Autoregressive Models
AR(1) 27.03 32.61 37.25 45.62 41.28 49.43 45.33 51.57
AR(2) 31.57 40.80 41.53 50.89 48.01 54.48 50.35 52.38
AR(3) 37.58 46.96 46.96 57.24 50.55 55.67 51.15 57.41
AR(1)-SV 27.23 32.07 38.89 46.72 43.58 51.81 47.82 55.36
Continued on next page
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h=1 h=2 h=3 h=4
Aaa spread Baa spread Aaa spread Baa spread Aaa spread Baa spread Aaa spread Baa spread
AR(2)-SV 31.94 41.05 41.87 51.88 48.34 55.95 52.20 53.62
AR(3)-SV 37.69 47.06 46.71 57.03 52.35 55.61 54.49 57.94
Autoregressive Distributed Lag Models ( = 3,  = 4)
ARX(1) 32.50 41.07 39.89 50.38 43.49 53.39 47.27 54.16
ARX(2) 37.47 46.93 43.26 55.99 46.05 56.40 48.06 54.03
ARX(3) 40.65 51.01 46.24 59.33 50.07 57.79 52.36 59.21
ARX(1)-SV 32.56 41.76 40.95 51.29 44.96 55.50 51.43 58
ARX(2)-SV 37.42 46.97 43.20 57.86 48.91 59.73 53.15 56.93
ARX(3)-SV 40.63 51.81 47.57 61.52 53.16 60.63 55.67 63.52
Autoregressive Distributed Lag Models ( = 3,  = 0)
ARX(1) 31.48 40.73 39.43 48.35 43.26 52.35 47.04 52.82
ARX(2) 37.95 47.04 44.29 55.96 47.35 55.72 49.80 53.73
ARX(3) 41.03 51.32 47.60 59.23 51.37 58.13 52.34 60.49
ARX(1)-SV 31.80 41.07 40.38 49.66 45.48 52.71 51.70 55.59
ARX(2)-SV 37.98 47.56 44.29 57.71 50.08 58.64 54.03 56.47
ARX(3)-SV 41.13 52.08 48.58 61.48 54.03 59.43 56.50 61.45
Autoregressive Distributed Lag Models ( = 7,  = 0)
ARX(1) 31.46 40.84 37.85 49.05 42.42 52.54 45.96 53.44
ARX(2) 37.55 47.65 44.04 56.02 46.37 56.81 49.26 56.55
ARX(3) 40.50 50.64 46.87 58.81 51.27 59.19 53.05 60.76
ARX(1)-SV 31.55 40.97 38.82 50.12 44.88 54.82 51.98 55.69
ARX(2)-SV 37.04 47.40 43.53 57.92 48.80 59.68 51.85 57.55
ARX(3)-SV 40.31 51.74 48.29 61.68 52.57 61.30 55.12 63.60
Notes: Out-of-sample performance in terms of the sum of root mean squared errors (RMSEs). Predictions
are computed in an rolling window fashion. The bold figures indicate the best performing model for a given
variable and time horizon. The following models nested in Eq. (3.2) are considered: RW - random walk,
AR - autoregressive model, ARX - autoregressive distributed lag model. The number in the parentheses
indicates the number of lags considered. SV refers to stochastic volatility.
Table F4: Robustness: Forecasting Evaluation (RMSEs + Extending Window).
h=1 h=2 h=3 h=4
Aaa spread Baa spread Aaa spread Baa spread Aaa spread Baa spread Aaa spread Baa spread
RW 27.92 33.90 33.59 43.20 39.09 48.54 42.21 53.16
Autoregressive Models
AR(1) 27.03 32.29 37.39 45.11 41.72 48.97 45.66 51.17
AR(2) 31.94 40.45 41.61 50.25 48.39 54.8 51.81 51.64
AR(3) 37.66 46.49 47.03 57.05 52.08 54.84 54.6 56.41
AR(1)-SV 26.98 31.81 37.71 46.53 42.84 51.25 48.58 55.07
AR(2)-SV 32.02 40.93 41.75 51.55 48.51 56.81 52.82 54.45
AR(3)-SV 37.76 46.96 46.74 57.61 52.32 55.25 55.43 58.83
Autoregressive Distributed Lag Models ( = 3,  = 4)
ARX(1) 32.43 40.40 39.39 48.50 41.60 52.23 44.95 53.46
ARX(2) 37.55 46.47 44.33 54.64 47.65 55.40 50.59 54.98
ARX(3) 41.10 51.11 48.70 57.55 53.42 57.99 53.52 61.41
ARX(1)-SV 32.65 41.46 40.03 50.49 42.31 54.97 47.73 58.36
Continued on next page
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Table F4 – Continued from previous page
h=1 h=2 h=3 h=4
Aaa spread Baa spread Aaa spread Baa spread Aaa spread Baa spread Aaa spread Baa spread
ARX(2)-SV 37.62 46.78 43.95 56.62 48.80 59.06 56.40 57.28
ARX(3)-SV 41.11 51.78 48.75 60.25 54.10 59.66 58.49 63.31
Autoregressive Distributed Lag Models ( = 3,  = 0)
ARX(1) 31.96 40.25 38.66 47.67 43.36 51.66 46.35 52.26
ARX(2) 37.59 46.23 44.37 54.23 49.46 54.77 53.30 54.28
ARX(3) 41.15 50.80 48.96 57.01 54.12 57.18 54.84 60.70
ARX(1)-SV 32.15 41.07 38.8 49.31 43.65 52.63 48.45 55.95
ARX(2)-SV 37.87 46.93 44.42 55.95 49.87 57.18 54.79 56.79
ARX(3)-SV 41.41 51.84 49.35 60.05 54.46 57.37 56.57 61.61
Autoregressive Distributed Lag Models ( = 7,  = 0)
ARX(1) 31.43 40.31 38.06 47.42 41.37 50.86 44.04 51.04
ARX(2) 37.33 46.71 43.85 54.89 47.13 54.65 51.16 54.47
ARX(3) 40.71 50.75 47.41 57.26 52.33 57.59 52.77 61.02
ARX(1)-SV 31.62 41.00 38.08 48.76 41.83 53.16 47.42 54.84
ARX(2)-SV 37.40 46.87 43.92 56.51 48.32 57.40 53.67 54.51
ARX(3)-SV 40.71 51.44 47.96 60.50 53.23 58.02 55.09 61.26
Notes: Out-of-sample performance in terms of the sum of root mean squared errors (RMSEs). Predictions
are computed in an extending window fashion. The bold figures indicate the best performing model
for a given variable and time horizon. The following models nested in Eq. (3.2) are considered: RW -
random walk, AR - autoregressive model, ARX - autoregressive distributed lag model. The number in the
parentheses indicates the number of lags considered. SV refers to stochastic volatility.
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G. Robustness: Identification
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Figure G2: Belief Surprises with two-step ahead horizon.
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Notes: Impulse response functions of the baseline VAR with two-step ahead belief surprises. Identification via
external instrument. Black line denotes median response while gray shaded areas denote the 68/80/90 percent
confidence intervals. The responses of stock market index, real activity, and prices are scaled in percent, while
the spread and interest rate responses are scaled in percentage points.
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Figure G3: Belief Surprises with three-step ahead horizon.
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0 4 8 12 16 20 24
Notes: Impulse response functions of the baseline VAR with three-step ahead belief surprises. Identification via
external instrument. Black line denotes median response while gray shaded areas denote the 68/80/90 percent
confidence intervals. The responses of stock market index, real activity, and prices are scaled in percent, while
the spread and interest rate responses are scaled in percentage points.
Figure G4: Belief Surprises with four-step ahead horizon.
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0 4 8 12 16 20 24
Notes: Impulse response functions of the baseline VAR with four-step ahead belief surprises. Identification via
external instrument. Black line denotes median response while gray shaded areas denote the 68/80/90 percent
confidence intervals. The responses of stock market index, real activity, and prices are scaled in percent, while
the spread and interest rate responses are scaled in percentage points.
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Figure G5: Belief Surprises with mean of all horizons.
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Notes: Impulse response functions of the baseline VAR with mean belief surprises over all horizons. Identification
via external instrument. Black line denotes median response while gray shaded areas denote the 68/80/90 percent
confidence intervals. The responses of stock market index, real activity, and prices are scaled in percent, while
the spread and interest rate responses are scaled in percentage points.
Figure G6: Placebo Identification.
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Notes: Impulse response functions of the baseline VAR with placebo belief surprises. Identification via external
instrument. Black line denotes median response while gray shaded areas denote the 68/80/90 percent confidence
intervals. The responses of stock market index, real activity, and prices are scaled in percent, while the spread
and interest rate responses are scaled in percentage points.
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Table G1: Test for Fundamentalness.
Principal components (from 1 to )
Shock Lags 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Recursive Identification
Aaa risk shock 1 0.76 0.91 0.98 0.39 0.10 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.15 0.17
Aaa risk shock 2 0.62 0.78 0.92 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.91 0.94
Aaa risk shock 3 0.73 0.84 0.19 0.31 0.44 0.52 0.28 0.21 0.27 0.21
Aaa risk shock 4 0.87 0.82 0.85 0.91 0.90 0.11 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.13
Baa risk shock 1 0.90 0.58 0.69 0.23 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.04 0.06 0.08
Baa risk shock 2 0.15 0.24 0.40 0.57 0.71 0.46 0.58 0.69 0.36 0.39
Baa risk shock 3 0.25 0.28 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00
Baa risk shock 4 0.99 0.34 0.53 0.68 0.80 0.39 0.31 0.41 0.51 0.57
External Instruments Identification
Aaa risk shock 1 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.12 0.11 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.02
Aaa risk shock 2 0.56 0.84 0.44 0.50 0.64 0.75 0.76 0.75 0.63 0.71
Aaa risk shock 3 0.81 0.84 0.08 0.14 0.16 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03
Aaa risk shock 4 0.43 0.44 0.23 0.36 0.39 0.15 0.08 0.11 0.16 0.09
Baa risk shock 1 0.03 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.00
Baa risk shock 2 0.82 0.77 0.34 0.32 0.44 0.53 0.54 0.64 0.62 0.70
Baa risk shock 3 0.83 0.45 0.07 0.14 0.16 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.07
Baa risk shock 4 0.69 0.30 0.35 0.51 0.66 0.32 0.12 0.17 0.23 0.12
Notes: Results of the Fundamentalness Test. Each entry of the Table reports the p-value of the F-test in a
regression of the non-rational risk shock estimated using the baseline specification on up to four lags of the
first  principal components,  = 1, . . . , 10.
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H. Model Specification and Data Choices
In this section, I present robustness with respect to model, lag, and data specification. The results are
presented in the following format in Figures H1 to H5: In each figure, I provide the impulse responses of
the baseline model presented in Section 4 of both identified risk shocks via recursive ordering or the external
instruments approach. For the robustness analysis I draw additional ten lines covering all combinations of
estimation with up to five lags and with or without stochastic volatility. While Figure H1 uses the baseline
data specification, I exchange one variable at at time in Figures H2 to H5: NASDAQ instead of S&P 500,
industrial production instead of GDP per capita, consumer prices instead of GDP deflator, and federal funds
rate instead of 1-year Treasury constant maturity yield. Data definitions and transformations can be found in
Appendix A.
Figure H1: Robustness: Baseline VAR.
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Notes: Impulse response functions of robust VARs of the baseline VAR. Identification via external instrument.
Black solid line denotes median response while gray shaded areas denote the 68/80/90 percent confidence intervals
and refer to the baseline model. Black dashed lines refer to additional models. The responses of stock market
index, real activity, and prices are scaled in percent, while the spread and interest rate responses are scaled in
percentage points.
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Figure H2: Robustness: NASDAQ.
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Notes: Impulse response functions of robust VARs estimated with NASDAQ. Identification via external instru-
ment. Black solid line denotes median response while gray shaded areas denote the 68/80/90 percent confidence
intervals and refer to the baseline model. Black dashed lines refer to additional models. The responses of stock
market index, real activity, and prices are scaled in percent, while the spread and interest rate responses are scaled
in percentage points.
Figure H3: Robustness: Industrial Production.
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Notes: Impulse response functions of robust VARs estimated with industrial production. Identification via
external instrument. Black solid line denotes median response while gray shaded areas denote the 68/80/90
percent confidence intervals and refer to the baseline model. Black dashed lines refer to additional models. The
responses of stock market index, real activity, and prices are scaled in percent, while the spread and interest rate
responses are scaled in percentage points.
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Figure H4: Robustness: Consumer Price Index.
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Notes: Impulse response functions of robust VARs estimated with the consumer price index. Identification via
external instrument. Black solid line denotes median response while gray shaded areas denote the 68/80/90
percent confidence intervals and refer to the baseline model. Black dashed lines refer to additional models. The
responses of stock market index, real activity, and prices are scaled in percent, while the spread and interest rate
responses are scaled in percentage points.
Figure H5: Robustness: Federal Funds Rate.
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Notes: Impulse response functions of robust VARs estimated with the federal funds rate. Identification via
external instrument. Black solid line denotes median response while gray shaded areas denote the 68/80/90
percent confidence intervals and refer to the baseline model. Black dashed lines refer to additional models. The
responses of stock market index, real activity, and prices are scaled in percent, while the spread and interest rate
responses are scaled in percentage points.
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Figure H6: Robustness: Wider Effects.
(a) Shock to Aaa belief surprises.
Aaa spread






























































(b) Shock to Baa belief surprises.
Baa spread



























































Notes: Impulse response functions of the VAR with wider macroeconomic effects. Identification via external
instrument. Identification via external instrument. Black solid line denotes median response while gray shaded
areas denote the 68/80/90 percent confidence intervals of the baseline model. Black dashed line indicates models
with additional macroeconomic variable. The responses of stock market index, real activity, and prices are scaled
in percent, while the spread and interest rate responses are scaled in percentage points.
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